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Abstract
Information technology has proliferated over the past two decades, and waste from
electronics represents the fastest growing waste stream in the world. The production and
disposal of electronics, from cradle to grave, pose critical threats to human health and the
environment. The management of electronic, or e-waste, streams poses a particular set of
challenges for solid waste management, hazardous waste management, and economic
development in the United States. As e-waste accumulates, state governments, municipalities
and private landfills are refusing to accept the responsibility for its disposal. To address this
problem, the federal and state governments must find a safe and economically feasible way
to process e-waste. This thesis analyzes the lessons learned from both the European Union’s
e-waste programs and from a set of US e-waste cases. These range from state-led e-waste
programs to manufacturer-led and voluntary e-waste programs. Based on this comparative
case method, a set of key barriers emerge in the US cases that undermine e-waste
management policies: the perception that US manufacturers will recycle electronic products
properly, the power of the electronics industry to block policies, the lack of public consumer
education about the environmental consequences of e-waste disposal, and the fact that
recycling e-waste is more expensive than extracting raw materials. These factors reflect
political and socio-economic realities within the US, including the power of the electronics
industry, the perceived capacity of municipal solid waste systems, and the salience and the
perception of consumers that US federal laws appropriately manage e-waste disposal. Part of
the issue is that e-waste falls into regulatory gaps across major waste management federal
laws. This thesis argues that state-led e-waste management policies are not adequate because
of the lack of cooperation from all e-waste stakeholders from the federal government, state
government, electronics industry, third party processors, and consumers.
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Executive Summary
Electronic waste (e-waste) supply chain management in the United States (US) needs further
improvement to impact amassing e-waste, to combat illegal export and illegal disposal
practices, and to relieve the administrative and legal burden it causes. In the US, 25 states
and Washington D.C. apply extended producer responsibility (EPR) programs to manage ewaste. In an EPR program, producers are held responsible for funding the collection,
recycling, and managing e-waste. EPR policies are based on the idea that because producers
have control over preventing waste, they should fund proper and responsible disposal of
existing e-waste, create products built for disassembly, and minimize the use of toxic
materials. However, the question remains whether these programs are effectively diverting ewaste from export and landfills, whether they are relieving the burden on consumers and
municipalities, and whether they are cost effective in the US.
Global awareness about e-waste began when non-profits, like Greenpeace, exposed
the dumping of millions of pounds of e-waste in developing countries such as Africa, China,
and India. E-waste is hazardous and toxic when humans are subjected to water, air and soil
contaminated by it. In response, the United Nations developed the Basel Convention treaty,
which bans all exports of e-waste to developing countries. Every nation has ratified the treaty
except for the US.1 The European Union (EU) was one of the first to fall in line with the
Basel Convention by creating the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE)
Directive.
This research uses analytics from the EU to ascertain incentives and barriers to
primary constituents such as consumers, producers, retailers, and governments that relate the
1

Although the US has not formally ratified the treaty, state practice in states that have passed laws on e-waste
management is to incorporate guidelines from the code set in the Basel Convention.
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US. While in the US, state-led EPR programs vary greatly from state to state and across
regions, the EU has well researched e-waste EPR and supply chain practices, and since many
producers are multinational producers, the incentives and barriers provide relevant
comparisons.
This thesis then assesses the e-waste supply chain in the US to understand why
domestic EPR programs have limits. It identifies incentives and barriers for key stakeholders
throughout the supply chain: producers, consumers, processors, retailers, and state/local
governments. Incentives for the producers and retailers include 1) to include other
stakeholders such as the consumers, governments, and processors as responsible parties to
reduce the burden, 2) to make programs inexpensive and easy to understand for producers in
states that have programs, 3) to follow the trend of ‘green’ products marketing to reach more
consumers and increase revenue, and 4) to allow manufacturers to work together under a
collective producer responsibility model (CPR) where producers hold each other
accountable. Barriers include 1) targets that are too stringent to meet, 2) programs that are
complex and expensive, and 3) producers as the primary or only responsible party. Research
on manufacture-led vs state-led programs indicates that both program structures have the
potential to successfully manage e-waste. More important factors are 1) ensuring that the
stakeholders are cooperating and 2) assessing state-level environments to identify individual
needs.
The thesis then focuses on two US states, Maine and Washington, to identify similar
trends (or differences) in stakeholder participation. These two cases offer insight into the
efficacy of state-run e-waste programs and some lessons learned from on-the-ground
experience. Maine and Washington are considered best practice states and have similar laws
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and programs to manage e-waste based on EPR principles. The case studies show that
successful practices from both states include, 1) obtaining support from the electronics
industry, 2) having state histories of environmental activism, 3) encouraging strong lobbying
efforts from non-profits and other organizations, and 4) maintaining and updating a website
for consumers to access disposal options for e-waste. Differences occurred in how the states
accomplish these goals. Maine gained support from the electronics industry by ensuring
profit and a revenue increase whereas Washington developed a council for manufacturers to
take control of their own funding and programs.
Public perception in the US is that this end-of-life technology, e-waste, is adequately
handled by current solid waste management policies. The reality is that e-waste is
burdensome for most states to handle because the existing facilities are not large enough to
handle such a volume. Governments, businesses, citizens, must understand the risks, costs,
and advantages associated with implementing e-waste regulations.
The thesis concludes that each state in the US has a unique set of needs for an e-waste
program to efficiently collect and process e-waste with minimal burden to each stakeholder
(i.e. producer, consumer, municipality, or government). Federal legislation is an ideal path to
manage e-waste because it relieves administrative burden for multinational companies,
reduces confusion for consumers and states, and tightens enforcement for transboundary
shipments of waste from one state to another. It must be stressed that a federal law is only
effective and ideal when the main governing entity, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), has the interest of safeguarding the environment in mind. If, for instance, the EPA is
likely to relax environmental regulations, then states are better off abiding by individual state
laws. To this end, this thesis further offers a set of policy recommendations that encourage
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states to strengthen their own programs by 1) developing a framework policy that involves a
network of surrounding states, 2) increasing monitoring and data collection efforts to better
quantify the progress of the EPR programs, and 3) to encourage incorporation of the support
of the electronics industry by means that reflect the needs of the industry and the state.

1

Chapter 1: Introduction
Expanded production and sale of electronic technology need carefully planned policies for its
maintenance and disposal. Since the 1980’s, technology’s use has shifted from being a
simple convenience to a necessity. E-mailing from a cell phone or answering a phone call
from nearly anywhere has become routine. Innovations in electronic technology have
produced innumerable benefits: revolutionizing international communication, improving
productivity, and creating a demand for raw materials (Veit & Bernardes, 2015). This
technology has generated the world’s fastest growing waste stream. Huge spikes in consumer
demand for electronics yield eventual huge spikes in electronic waste. Globally, the United
Nations documented e-waste growing at a rate almost three times faster than any other
municipal solid waste stream2 (Schwarzer, Bonno, Peduzzi, Guiliani, & Kluser, 2005). Now
with the huge spike in e-waste or waste electric and electronic equipment (WEEE) comes the
need to control that waste management and its high costs to the environment and humanity.
The problem with this rapid accumulation is that electronics are not so easy to dispose
of as they are to buy. Most often, consumers discard e-waste in the garbage thinking there is
no other feasible, free option for disposal. Industry leaders, such as Dell or Best Buy, often
resist introducing free take-back programs because recycling e-waste is expensive and
complex. Cheaper disposal routes are usually landfilling, exporting, or incinerating e-waste
(Sepulveda, et al., 2010). Improper disposal from these cheaper options results in serious
environmental and human health concerns (EPA, 2017). For example, landfilled e-waste
leaches heavy metals and hazardous chemicals including lead, PCBs, hexavalent chromium,
2

The UNU reported global annual e-waste generation at 41.8 million tons, enough to fill the
Rose Bowl 76 times (Baldé, Wang, Kuehr, & Huisman, 2015). It is reportedly difficult to
quantify WEEE due to information gaps, however the UNU provides the most thorough
methodology to date with the available statistical data (Baldé, et al., 2015).
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and cadmium into the soil and waterways3 (United Nations University, 2007). Incinerating ewaste releases particulate matter and ozone depleting substances into the atmosphere.
Chronic exposure to toxic waste such as e-waste can lead to mental impairment, cancer,
kidney and liver failure, not to mention degrading soil, air, and waterways4.
The primary focus of this thesis examines the current state government e-waste
management practices in the US based on extended producer responsibility (EPR). Two areas
of interest are analyzing first how various stakeholders, i.e. producers, consumers,
government, respond to e-waste policies. The second area of interest is following how the
formulation and implementation styles of those existing programs balances stakeholder
needs. To address these issues this thesis looks at the progress of EPR programs in the US
and asks what are the key barriers to a more effective implementation of EPR in the United
States?
The US is a major generator of e-waste, generating about 7.1 million tons in 2014,
almost double the 3.14 million tons generated just three years before (Baldé, et al., 2015; PSI,
2016). Managing e-waste in the US poses a set of challenges with regulatory gaps being the
primary concern. While a few major environmental laws do exist in the US to address
responsible disposal for waste products, there is no federal law that regulates e-waste
specifically. Lack of federal action leaves the responsibility of e-waste disposal to private
corporate initiatives or to the states. Thus, e-waste regulation falls between two major federal
laws: the 1965 Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) and the 1976 Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA). The SWDA regulates everyday refuse and RCRA regulates

3

Appendix holds a more detailed account of the hazardous components within e-waste.
Refer to Appendix A for an outline of the most common and prevalent WEEE components
with the potential risks.

4
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hazardous waste. An expired personal computer, for example, can be thrown away while
meeting the guidelines of SWDA, but the inner components are made up of heavy metals and
plastic that become hazardous in large quantities. E-waste is not explicitly covered either law
meaning that decades of e-waste has entered landfills or incinerators in relatively small
quantities. Thus, leading to millions of pounds of improperly disposed hazardous material
over a period from the 1980’s until the early 2000’s in the US.
Lack of a unified federal regulatory system governing the states has created a second
challenge: a fragmented system of state laws that emerged in the 2000’s to manage e-waste
disposal. Each state has applied a different set of guidelines. For instance, some states allow
landfill disposal of e-waste, some do not. Some states have responsible e-waste disposal
initiatives called e-Cycle programs that require stakeholders throughout the supply chain to
recycle and some states do not address the e-waste issue at all. State-led e-Cycle programs
attempt to tackle the e-waste crisis, but offer instead a fragmented array of state-led policies
and the manufacturer-led programs. External stakeholders, like the Electronics TakeBack
Campaign (now called the Electronics TakeBack Coalition (ETBC)), Basel Action Network
the Product Stewardship Institute, the Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC), and many
others validated the need for state-led legislation for WEEE (Gui, Atasu, Ozlem, & Toktay,
2013).
Currently, one cutting edge policy option is extended producer responsibility (EPR)
that was created to reduce the waste stream and to avoid the leakage problem. Most US state
laws are EPR based policies. EPR is a policy principle5 that requires manufacturers to be

5

EPR is a policy principle meaning that it is a guideline to apply to existing policies or a
guideline to form policies upon, however it is not a stand-alone policy. For example, take-
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financially responsible for the entire life-cycle of the product including the take-back and
final disposal of obsolete products. (Lindhqvist, 2000). Only 25 states in the US have
adopted an EPR scheme to address e-waste issues. A patchwork structure of either voluntary
initiatives led by private groups and/or a small number of states with public initiatives
makes-up of US e-waste mitigation strategies rather than one overarching program. In recent
years (2011-2014), federal initiatives have focused on national stewardship programs like the
National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship (NSES) rather than passing a law (EPA, 2017).
The NSES is a task force that provides recommendations for all stakeholders in the e-waste
supply chain. This thesis examines the progress of EPR programs in the US and asks what
are the key barriers to a more effective implementation of EPR in the United States? To
answer this question, this thesis compares two of the most established states: Maine and
Washington. Maine and Washington both have a state-led regulatory framework.
Chapter 2 provides a background on international e-waste emergence, its
dissemination into the US, and mitigation strategies. Chapter 3 includes a review of the
literature regarding stakeholder participation and e-waste management cases. In addition,
chapter 3 provides literature of stakeholder behavior of key actors throughout the life cycle of
e-waste along with an outline of their incentives for participation. Chapter 4 assesses the pros
and cons of manufacturer-led and state-led approaches by following the life cycle of e-waste
in two state-led programs, Maine and Washington, alongside a shorter comparison of
voluntary programs in 5 other states. The 5 states represent the range in e-waste management
systems. By following the product from sale to disposal, certain cases will identify loopholes within e-waste governance in both mandated and voluntary programs. A typology of
back legislation is a common policy used to implement the EPR scheme, but the two are not
used interchangeably. One is a policy, the other is a scheme (Lindhqvist, 2000).

5
adjacent states will be used to discern key factors of what produce a successful program.
Identifying gaps in the life cycle of e-waste will enable policy analysts working on e-waste
control to address factors that hinder the effectiveness of existing EPR schemes in the US.
Policy makers may modify legislation to accommodate all stakeholders and therefore provide
a more cohesive, stable system. Chapter 5 makes policy recommendations for US EPR
programs and e-waste recycling initiatives.
Outcomes of this research concur that there is not enough statistical data to determine
trends from either a national or state perspective, even in states with strong regulations. The
efficiency of EPR programs for e-waste is contingent upon individual state needs.
Observations show that state-led systems achieve higher targets, but with the available data,
it seems the programs are plateauing with reported recycled e-waste. State-led systems with
the strongest programs are successful if 1) they have a history of environmental activism at
the state level, 2) they have strong state level lobbying efforts by non-profits and the public,
3) they overcome the opposition by electronics industry effectively, and 4) the state in
question has supportive cross-boundary relationships from near-by states. The primary
recommendation supports using federal legislation, as seen in the EU since most states with
existing e-waste laws defer to the guidelines of EU policies like the WEEE Directive. One
salient law that would solve the transboundary issues between states and reduce complexity
for business. In the absence of one unified set of regulations, recommendations to improve
existing programs include: 1) establishing a stronger and more consistent data collection at
the state level. Data will generate urgency and provide a foundation for understanding the
extent of the e-waste crisis; 2) developing an effective lobbying campaign. Lobbyists
influence the industry leaders by focusing on their green reputations and encourage business

6
buy-ins, rather than influencing legislation, 3) creating policies that correspond with those of
neighboring states, and 4) changing the metric of monitoring that measures e-waste recycling
from ‘weight’ to ‘number of products’. The amount of recycled e-waste is typically measured
by weight, and as electronics become lighter, the poundage will not reflect the amounts
recycled.

7

Chapter 2: E-waste and the US: What is it and how did it develop?
This chapter defines e-waste and explains why e-waste is hazardous. Then, the following
section discusses the history of e-waste policy in the European Union to follow the evolution
of e-waste policy leading up to the US. The chapter follows the history of e-waste by
introducing e-waste management strategies and the chapter finishes by laying out the
background of e-waste of key regulatory frameworks in the US. The key regulatory frames
are two US federal laws: SWDA and RCRA. Alongside the two federal laws are a patchwork
of 25 states that have EPR policies, private corporate initiatives, non-profit stewardship
programs, and a national stewardship program led by the EPA. The background of the US
explains the complexities for e-waste management for stakeholders within the e-waste supply
chain.

2.1 E-waste: the basics
The focus of this thesis is the US, but the e-waste issue is global and as such has similarities
that all nations understand. The following section provides the background of e-waste.

2.11 What is e-waste?
There is no standard definition to date for e-waste or waste electric and electronic equipment
(WEEE), but for this thesis, e-waste refers to the disposal of electronic components of any
appliance that uses electricity6 (OECD, 2001). E-waste is a broad term for electric and
electronic equipment (EEE) that has reached its life cycle limit. Every state compiles an
6

There is no universal definition of e-waste because every nation has a different idea about
what constitutes as e-waste. At the national or sub-national level, there are varying degrees
that e-waste is regulated. Some nations cover all parts of a computer– monitor, keyboard,
mouse – whereas another country only covers the monitor.
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individual list of what it constitutes as e-waste. Appendix C has a table of the products
recycled by each state.

2.12 How much e-waste is there?
WEEE is one of the fastest growing waste streams across the world. The amounts of e-waste
continually grow because e-waste is generated more rapidly than it can be processed. As of
2014, the UN reported global e-waste generation at 41.8 million tons7, a number expected to
climb to 50 million tons by 2018 (Baldé, et al., 2015). The US EPA reported 2.4 million tons
of e-waste in 2009 and expected that number to rise radically (EPA, 2017).

2.13 Where does it come from?
Nonprofit groups, like BAN or Greenpeace, have traced sources of e-waste from the
European Union, the United States, and Japan to multiple countries in Asia and Africa (BAN,
2002). Manufacture and use of electronic products primarily in developed countries, but most
e-waste predominately ends up in the Global South. Analyzing the transboundary flows of ewaste is beyond the scope of this thesis, but research indicates that much of the U.S. and the
EU e-waste streams end up in an (often cheaper) international illegal waste industry (Zhang,
Schnoor, & Zeng, 2012).

2.14 Why is e-waste hazardous?
E-waste comprises thousands of plastics, metals, and rubber materials. Appendix A provides
a list of the common materials found in e-waste that are often carcinogenic and persistent in
7

These estimations vary depending on the country, time frames, or region and because of a
discrepancy among how they define-waste.
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the environment (BAN, 2002). There is concern about certain types of plastic, (polyvinyl
chloride) PVC, for example. PVC is a hormone disruptor in humans and also releases dioxin
into the environment when burned (Schwarzer, Bono, Giuliana, & Kluser, 2005). Heavy
metals, like lead, cadmium, and mercury, are carcinogenic and known to accumulate in living
organisms (Sepulveda, et al., 2010). Although these materials are not always toxic in small
quantities, they become a threat with prolonged their exposure to living organisms or as
waste accumulates at a dump site, landfill or incinerator. Heavy metals can enter the soilfood-crop pathway, increasing exposure to animals and humans (McAllister, 2013).
Exposure to these substances poses a threat to the public and the environment,
especially when e-waste is not properly disposed of. Contact with these toxins is particularly
problematic for less developed countries as they are disproportionately burdened with ewaste (BAN, 2002). Due to a lack of funding, inadequate infrastructure, and poor working
conditions, the people and the environment typically have tons of e-waste with only the
ability to manage it by shredding and then burning or melting, or landfill disposal
(Lindhqvist, et al., 2007).

2.15 What does responsible disposal imply?
Ideally, e-waste and all its components would be recycled and re-used in a close-loop system.
As e-waste was not built for break down, realistic, responsible disposal of e-waste in any
context requires: 1) a safe environment for processors, 2) containment of hazardous waste
effluent from e-waste, 3) recycling as much as possible, 4) only incinerating or landfilling
non-toxic and non-hazardous parts, and 5) not carelessly dumping e-waste without
processing.
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One scheme is to break down the product and separate out independent components
(Schwarzer, et al., 2005). Items that need to be processed further would be done in a
ventilated place where the workers were wearing appropriate coverage, i.e. gloves and mask.
For example, a personal computer would first be dismantled and separated into plastics,
cathode ray tubes (CRT)8, circuit boards, etc. The CRTs would be sent to a third-party
recycling facility, as would the circuit boards, to either be recycled into new products or
precious metals, like gold, are extracted for later resale. Atlee and Kirchain (2006) break
down the flow of e-waste through a responsible disposal system. In an ideal situation, ewaste is collected, disassembled, sorted, and then processed for materials. Materials of value
include copper, lead, and metal. Expenses include CRTs, landfill material, and hazardous
material.

2.16 Why is e-waste a concern for policy makers?
E-waste poses numerous challenges for policy makers. First, it has become a social justice
issue as it poses a threat to public health and the environment, often in the Global South, far
from consumers of the products. Second, e-waste is also seen as a security issue as many
products hold valuable personal information about individuals. A third indirect challenge is
that difficulties in categorizing and recycling e-waste in the US leads to very complex and
costly recycling programs reducing the opportunities for profit. Therefore, the cheaper routes
of illegal export, illegal dumping, incineration, or landfilling along with the consequent
environmental and health risks, persist.
8

Cathode ray tubes were used predominantly in electronics before flat screens were invented.
CRTs are typically of most concern when it comes to outdated e-waste because they are
composed of leaded glass. This leaded glass is both difficult and expensive to recycle, and
contains a neurotoxin – lead.
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The informal recycling sector that has emerged in developing countries is a serious
competitor with responsible e-waste management initiatives. The informal recycling sector
for e-waste handles about 50-80 percent of global e-waste. Although people in the Global
South often resort to shredding, burning, and melting e-waste in unsafe environments, it is a
cheaper resort (McAllister, 2013).

2.17 Summary
The prior section provides the fundamentals of the global e-waste issues before delving into
the US history of e-waste and its complexities. In short, e-waste is a rising crisis that needs
managing, but e-waste is difficult to manage because e-waste is 1) difficult to categorize, 2)
expensive to disassemble, 3) difficult to quantify because there are decades of unmonitored
dumpsites across the world, and the public assumes that e-waste is harmless or that it is
managed properly. Despite the complexities, the public sector is pursuing proper waste
management. The short section 2.2 now presents the e-waste policy issue in US.

2.2 Existing solid waste management in the US
The purpose of this section is to situate the e-waste policy dilemma in the US. Beginning
with how e-waste emerged onto the national agenda, the following section will continue to
explain how e-waste policies translated from an international level down to the US.

2.21 E-waste issue emergence in the US
The platform for the e-waste policy issues to emerge onto the scene was driven by 1) rising
public awareness for protecting the environment in the 1970’s and 1980’s, 2) the
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enforcement of the Basel Convention in the 1990’s, 3) international exposure of illegal
dumping of e-waste by the US in the 2000s, and 4) lobbying efforts by NGOs and the public
that pushed for responsible e-waste management in the 2000s.
Beginning in the 1970s to the 1980s, the US shifted focus from disposal to recycling
and re-use when the Love Canal case in 1978 proved ‘out-of-sight and out-of-mind’ practices
were insufficient (Oklahoma DEQ, 2016). Love Canal is a famous case where toxic
chemicals seeped out of a dumpsite into the land of nearby communities9. Despite action at
the domestic level to regulate hazardous waste, the US has been resistant to ratify the Basel
Convention and to regulate the global movement of hazardous wastes.
There is a significant presence of the electronics industry based in the United States:
Apple, Hewlett Packard, Lenovo, Walmart, and Best Buy that all have significant leverage
over e-waste governance. The concern for e-waste grew throughout the 1990s and into the
early 2000s from the presence of environmental lobbyists, concerned citizens, and the one of
the strongest NGOs, the Basel Action Network (BAN), (BAN, 2002). BAN is a non-profit
based is Washington State that is a watchdog over the trade and recycling of e-waste and they
seek to adopt the Basel Convention initiative to the US.
The US responded to public complaints with stringent environmental regulations and
the creation of such governing agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to
oversee environmental concerns. Most of these regulations for hazardous waste were costly
and required treatment or proper recycling (Closed Loop Fund, 2016). Often the cheaper
option of dumping toxic materials in developing countries like Africa and Eastern Europe
where there were few regulations or safeguards was taken (UNEP, 2016). Recognition of this
9

Soon after, Congress passed Superfund to remediate old contamination sites (Oklahoma
DEQ, 2016).
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injustice provoked an international response that resulted in the 1989 Basel Convention in
Switzerland. The Basel Convention will be discussed in more detail later in section 3.4, but it
was after this event that e-waste management took hold in the US in the early 2000s. An
environmental activist, John Puckett, founded a non-profit called BAN in Seattle that
materialized a face for the e-waste crisis in the US.

2.22 What does responsible disposal look like in the US?
The existing responsible disposal system in the U.S. is typically a cradle-to-grave system that
begins with a generator and ends with a recycler, an incinerator, or the landfill (EPA, 2013).
Essential objectives for the system include providing safe working conditions, containing
hazardous substances and transporting them to a treatment facility, and recycling or
landfilling non-hazardous components. RCRA and SWDA outline how specific materials are
handled (EPA, 2014).
Electronics are collected at monthly collection opportunities, by the curbside or at a
collection site, refurbished or disassembled for parts. Some states, but not all, have created
responsible programs to manage e-waste (EPA, 2011). Most states with existing programs
are either in a fledgling status and need more robust implementation. Federal agencies like
the EPA and state environmental agencies encourage donating electronics second-hand or
recycling them (EPA, 2015).

2.23 US Governance structure of the waste stream
Two main laws SWDA and RCRA (discussed in more detail later) designate the EPA as the
governing agency over solid and hazardous wastes. The EPA typically assigns responsibility
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over to the individual states for implementation of solid waste management practices. At this
point, each state takes the initiative to either enact a law, implement a program, enforce
concentration guidelines of hazardous effluents, etc. Since it e-waste is not outlined
anywhere nationally, states are not legally required to adopt e-waste management practices.

2.24 History of federal laws in the US
Televisions, video game consoles, and personal computers were used widely since at least
the late 30s, 60s, and 70s, respectively (Doms, 2004). However, it was not until the late
1980’s to the early 1990’s, sales of electronics dramatically increased (Doms, 2004).
Technology was advancing rapidly to accommodate the surge of the internet during the same
time the environmental movement was taking root in the US and in the early stages of
identifying hazardous waste.
The US was historically a strong leader in environmental regulation. The US was the
first nation to implement and enforce laws on environmental concerns with waste in response
to rapid industrialization and urbanization in the 1970s. (Oklahoma DEQ, 2016). The Solid
Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) in 1965 was the first federal law to manage national waste. The
SWDA seeks to reduce waste responsibly and safely for humans and the environment.
The federal government formed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
alongside the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1970 for hazardous waste
(EPA, 2014). RCRA amends the SWDA by requiring additional government involvement
and includes guidelines for hazardous waste. These are the two main laws that cover waste
management that contribute to a regulatory gap for e-waste. The SWDA and RCRA
designate the governing agency over e-waste as the EPA.
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Since the 1970s, the US at the federal level has moved on managing and reducing the
waste stream. There is a suite of federal laws in place shown in table 1 that were put in place
to address the rising concern over environmental toxins. Other federal laws relating to
environmental protection or the management of waste:

Table 1. Federal Laws Related to Electronic Waste Management
Year
Law
1965
Solid Waste Disposal Act
1976*
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
1976
Toxic Substances Control Act
1978
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
1984
Hazardous and Solid Wastes Amendments Act
1986
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
1990*
Pollution Prevention Act
1996*
Land Disposal Program Flexibility Act
1996
Mercury Containing & Rechargeable Battery Management Act
2002
Small Business Liability & Brownfields Revitalization Act
2011*
Responsible Electronics Recycling Act
*Highlights important laws pertaining to the separate components of electronic waste once
they become hazardous.
It is important to recognize that only one law addresses electronics specifically, and this law
bans the exportation of end-of-life electronic products internationally called the Responsible
Electronics Recycling Act of 2011. For the US, this law is in lieu of ratifying the Basel
Convention Ban Amendment that banned all transboundary exports of e-waste (BAN, 2002).

2.25 Why are the existing federal laws insufficient for e-waste management?
E-waste has not been completely captured by these federal laws. The fate of e-waste is left to
either solid waste management which does not provide strict oversight or to hazardous waste
management that follow a strict cradle to grave management system. There have been no
updates to federal law, although the science and technology has changed significantly. In
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2005, the EPA submitted a design for a national system, but never materialized (EPA, 2005).
The only action taken by the federal government, via the EPA, was the National Strategy for
Electronics Stewardship (NSES) (EPA, 2017). The NSES is a council made up of 16 federal
agencies that provides recommendations for electronics industry, retailers, consumers, and
state governments.
Other laws shown in table 1 address materials within the EEE, but since electronics
are typically disposed of in full through household or small business waste, these laws do not
apply until the landfill reaches toxic concentration levels.
Household waste is permitted in landfills under RCRA, as well as waste from small
businesses because small amounts of hazardous waste in the landfill or incinerated waste was
thought of as low risk to public health (EPA, 2013). That is until household e-waste began to
corrode and leak over time after its internal components were broken open and exposed to
the environment This became a problem when “safe levels” of waste were exceeded after
piling up over a long period.
To underline the point: at the start, e-waste fails to meet the RCRA definition of
hazardous waste (Musson et al., 2006). The test thus allows potentially hazardous products to
be exposed to the expected leaching conditions in a landfill. The EPA then tests the leachate
to determine if it contains any toxic substances above the defined threshold (Musson et al.,
2006). The issue with the initial definition is that it tests e-waste as a whole product rather
than its parts, which may not adequately reflect the individual toxicity of each component
(GAO, 2010). If these levels do not exceed a certain limit, as monitored by the EPA, then
disposal is permitted.
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Furthermore, hazardous waste disposal from households and small businesses is
exempt from regulation under RCRA. For example, RCRA allows the EPA to monitor and
evaluate hazardous waste that exhibits toxic characteristics (among others) (GAO, 2008).
Further, RCRA only regulates CRTs, which are inside most electronic products like older
computer monitors and televisions. The components of e-waste are inarguably toxic, yet most
electronic products inevitably pass the leachate test by the EPA. Household e-waste is legally
considered non-hazardous, thus making its management a state issue rather than a federal.

2.26 E-waste as a universal waste
For some states, e-waste is listed as a universal waste10, which means that the waste is
nationally recognized as hazardous and follows a streamlined set of regulations. (EPA,
2013). The EPA sets the general guidelines of universal waste to control collection and
recycling of waste, divert waste from landfills, and to reduce the burden on retail stores. It is
then up to the states whether they adopt e-waste as under the ‘universal waste’ category.
Table 2 shows states that have included electronics under the category of universal waste.

Table 2. States to adopt electronics as universal waste.
Universal Waste Material
Cathode Ray Tubes (CRTSs)
Electronics

Adopting States
Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey

Source: EPA, 2016.

10

Universal waste is a category of hazardous waste that multiple industries generate (EPA,
2013). Under universal waste regulations, waste can be stored for up to one year upon
disposal.
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2.27 Life cycle flow of e-waste in the US: where does it go?
The flow of electronics in the US shown in Figure 1 is adopted from Duan, Miller, Gregory,
& Kirchain (2013) that modeled the domestic life-cycle of end-of-life electronics.

Figure 1. Flow of Electronic Products in the US.

Source: Duan, Miller, Gregory, & Kirchain, 2013.
The cycle starts with purchasing of the product, rather than product design, and continues
towards storage and recycling. For example, a person named Claudia may purchase a laptop
from the Microsoft® store. Claudia will use the laptop for a period until it either does not
work or until something new comes out. She finds a new laptop that works faster, so she just
stores the old laptop in the attic. When it finally stopped working, she took it to local
collection event in town to recycle it. Depending on the state, the laptop is either landfilled,
dismantled for parts, or exported as a secondhand good. Secondhand goods can only legally
be exported if they are tested and functional. From 2006-2009 about 75%-78% of e-waste
ended up in landfills (EPA, 2017).
This process, however, does not adequately reflect the total volume of e-waste
because a significant portion of e-waste is still thought to be held in storage in some capacity
– houses, small businesses, basements. Illegal export of electronic waste is a persisting issue,
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for example, Beveridge and Diamond reported a recycling company exporting over a million
dollars’ worth of e-waste over four years (Beveridge and Diamond, 2013). Figure 1 is a
general guideline for the flow of electronics in the US. The cycle of electronics will vary
within each state given the fragmented nature of policies in the US.

2.28 Conclusion
The recent section serves to outline the existing legislation that is available for state
governments to address e-waste management. EPA is the governing agency that enforces the
two primary laws, SWDA and RCRA, but the EPA authorizes states to implement by choice
their own programs and laws for e-waste. The following section explains the new tools that
states began adopting to secure funding for the recycling and disposal of e-waste called
extended producer responsibility.

2.3 New tools to manage e-waste
A variety of tools exist for managing e-waste11. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the
predominant policy principle used for addressing e-waste in the US: extended producer
responsibility (EPR).

2.31 What is EPR?
Extended producer responsibility (EPR)12 was coined in 1990 and is a policy mechanism that
requires manufacturers to fund recycling and/or proper disposal of end-of-life products (Nash

11

Advanced recovery fees (ARFs) are the competing policy tool used in the US, but will not
be addressed in the scope of this thesis.
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& Bosso, 2013). The official definition given by the environmental strategies expert, Thomas
Lindhqvist of Sweden13, is as follows:
A policy principle to promote total life cycle environmental improvements of
product systems by extending the responsibilities of the manufacturer of the
product to various parts of the entire life cycle of the product, and especially to
the take-back, recycling and final disposal of the product. A policy principle is
the basis for selecting the mix of policy instruments that are to be used in the
particular case. Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is implemented
through the administrative, economic, and informative policy instruments
(Lindhqvist, 2000, p. 154).
EPR was designed to promote cleaner waste management schemes and cleaner
production (Lindhqvist, 2000). It was introduced during the movement in the 1990s
towards environmental awareness and public concern for waste management in Europe
and China (BAN, 2002). EPR principles shift responsibility away, theoretically, from
consumers, municipalities, and designated authorities to the producer of products. In
short, EPR reflects “pollution prevention”, “life cycle thinking”, and “polluter pays”
principles (p. 9).

2.32 Types of EPR instruments
EPR shows up in various ways and each program may utilize more than one instrument
at a time. Table 1 highlights the available policy tools used to implement EPR.

12

EPR was proposed at the Swedish Ministry of the Environment identifying producers as
financially responsible for the environmental consequence of their products (Lindhqvist,
2000). Lindhqvist intended EPR as an ideal used within a policy package, but EPR itself is
not a policy instrument like a take-back mandate or economic incentive (Lindhqvist,
Manomaivibool, & Tojo, 2007).
13
There is also another claimant as the founder of EPR, Hans Töpfer, a German Minister of
the Environment around 1990. However, further research revealed inconclusive information
as to whether he played an official role (Lifset, 1993).
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Table 3. Types of EPR instruments.
Type of EPR approach
Product take-back programs
Economic

Regulatory

Tools
- Voluntary or negotiated take-back
programs
- Mandatory take-back programs
- Deposit-refund scheme
- Advance recycling fees
- Fees on disposal
- Material taxes/subsidies
- Minimum product standards
- Prohibitions of specific hazardous
materials or products
- Disposal bans
- Mandated recycling

Voluntary industry practices

- Voluntary codes of practice
- Public/private partnerships
- Leasing and servicing
- Product labeling
Source: OECD, 2001; adopted from Khetriwal, 2009.

2.33 Can manufacturers work together or independently?
Depending on the mandate, manufacturers may work together (collective producer
responsibility) or independently (independent producer responsibility) to meet the mandated
targets (Atasu, Van Wassenhove, & Sarvary, 2009).
Collective producer responsibility (CPR) indicates that manufacturers cooperate on
managing e-waste throughout the life cycle. For example, Washington State has a CPR
program wherein all multi-national electronics manufacturers, i.e. Sony®, Apple®,
Microsoft®, etc., oversee funding, collecting, processing, and disposing of e-waste because it
is required under a mandatory take-back program (DOE, 2007). The benefit of such a
program is that if one company falls short in meeting the funding requirement or set target,
the other companies will fill in the gap.
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Individual collection requires each manufacturer to manage their own product. For
instance, Apple ® has a voluntary take-back program after developing its latest robot, Liam
(“Coalition wants more”, 2005). Liam was built to disassemble the latest iPhones; thus,
Apple is voluntarily taking back its products and only its products.

2.34 Conclusion
Section 2.2 provides a brief background into EPR schemes and how those tools may be used
in a program. The purpose of the EPR background information is helpful to understand the
development of policies, particularly in the US and to give context to the case studies
covered in the chapter 4. The next section will discuss issue emergence in the US and how
EPR was introduced as a solution.

2.4 EPR and the United States
Section 2.3 was a brief overview of what EPR is and the different capacities EPR can be
applied. Section 2.4 presents the structure of EPR in the US and explains the general drivers
to the fragmented EPR system.

2.41 The US at a glance: what does e-waste management look like today?
For the U.S., e-waste refers to products like desktop computers, televisions, laptops, and
peripherals in some cases. See Appendix C for a breakdown of products by state. This
definition of the waste stream does not include other hazardous components14. The laws

14

The management of electronics varies per region. For the US, products such as batteries,
cathode ray tubes (CRTs), nor other consumer goods that contribute to e-waste like cell
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governing e-waste vary by state, by the number of products covered, and how they cover
them.
The United States has a fragmented EPR system for e-waste that emerged in the early
2000s. These fragmented systems consist of a variety of either of state-led programs or
voluntary initiatives led by manufacturers. Almost 25 states have enacted legislation
mandating statewide e-waste recycling and take-back as shown in Figure 2. All green
states15, whether they have public or voluntary programs, require some form of Producer
Responsibility for end-of-life products (Electronics Takeback Coalition, 2013).

Figure 2. States with existing EPR take back legislation.

There are several factors that contribute to the patchwork state policies rather than an
overarching federal regulation of e-waste in the US. These include 1) the power of the

phones have their own laws and therefore individual management separate from that of
electronics. These products are beyond the scope of this thesis.
15
California and Utah have laws in place to manage e-waste, however Utah only requires
manufacturers to educate post-consumer disposal options and California implemented
consumer fees at the point of sale to cover disposal. These states are not covered in the scope
of this thesis.
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electronics industry and 2) competing ideas over who bears responsibility, either the
consumer, industry or state for e-waste management (Nash & Bosso, 2013). In addition, 3)
in some places, the general public and the public sector perceive that there is already
sufficient governance in place to manage the waste stream. The combination of these ideas
obscured the identification as e-waste as problem across states (Lepawsky, 2012). The
following section will describe the historical events leading up to the perception of e-waste as
a public-sector problem in the US. United States EPR policies have morphed from producer
responsibility into producer stewardship (Short, 2004).

2.42 When did EPR enter waste management practices?
EPR was introduced into waste management practices in the US during the early 1990s for
various hazardous wastes like batteries or paint (Nash & Bosso, 2013). It was not until the
early 2000s, however, that EPR was used for electronics when states started to examine a
range of policy options, including the EPR policy legacy. EPR policies targeting WEEE were
first implemented in the US in 2004 in Maine. EPR policies take many forms depending on
the implementing state. Variance between states include specific performance levels, fees if
performance levels are not met, and some framework policies incorporate responsibilities for
retailers and consumers (Nash & Bosso, 2013).

2.43 Other stakeholder initiatives involving EPR: voluntary initiatives
As these state level policies are expensive for manufacturers, the manufacturers began to
press for their own voluntary programs and national coalitions because they would be
cheaper (Consumer Technology Association, 2015). National coalitions take the form of non-
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profit agencies that developed in lieu of federal action. These initiatives have successfully
recycled 281,000 Mt of electronics in 2013 (Consumer Electronics Association, 2013).
Typically, nationwide coalitions like the Consumer Electronics Associations (CEA), organize
an industry-led effort to manage e-waste at multiple points in the life cycle (Consumer
Electronics Association, 2013).
External stakeholders, like the Electronics TakeBack Coalition (ETBC), Basel Action
Network the Product Stewardship Institute, and many others validated the need for state-led
legislation for WEEE (Gui, et al., 2013). In 2005, the ETBC unified the perspective of
multiple environmental groups to push for Apple to offer free recycling for all Apple
products and not just iPods (“Coalition wants more”, 2005). This group specifically pushed
for e-waste legislation in four states, including Washington. This environmental support
directed at state and major metropolitan areas has sponsored numerous policies and
resolutions, such as the Washington e-Cycle program or the Connecticut Recycling Law, to
reduce economics, health, and environmental impacts (PSI, 2016).

2.45 Why is the US a patchwork of voluntary and mandated initiatives?
Notably, The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the federal agency with
oversight over solid waste management, including WEEE. The EPA is the supervising
agency while states are responsible for implementation. The EPA delegates responsibility of
solid waste management issues over to the states (EPA, 2013). In response to this rising
pressure16, from 2001 – 2004, the EPA attempted to organize a council called the National

16

E-waste management became an agenda item for the EPA after states, trade associations
(like Electronic Industries Alliance), and environmental advocate groups (like BAN) pushed
for fair and sustainable recycling efforts (Greenbiz, 2004).
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Electronics Product Stewardship Initiative (NEPSI)17 based on the EPR principle (Nash &
Bosso, 2013). NEPSI sought to reach a national agreement on ways to finance e-waste
recycling and disposal by combining efforts of electronics producers, retailers, and
governments (GAO, 2005). NEPSI was an intended formalized council to tackle e-waste on a
broad scale.
The industry representatives were multi-national companies that included Dell,
Epson, Hewlett Packard, Panasonic, and Sharp (GreenBiz, 2004). These companies are large
corporations and would show the greatest hope at tackling e-waste disposal on a large scale.
The initiative collapsed in large part because of a lack of support from television producers.
Televisions make up for more than half of documented e-waste and without the support of
television producers, the rest of the industry feared funding e-waste management would be
too expensive (Nash & Bosso, 2013). Again, burdening states and municipalities with the
responsibility to govern e-waste disposal (GAO, 2005).

2.46 Conclusion
The previous section provides the current structure of EPR in the US and explains that while
other national initiatives were attempted by the EPA, they failed. The patchwork of EPR
states is a result of competing interests and a failure of governing agencies to collaborate
with the electronics industry.

17

Again in 2011, the National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship was introduced to
improve management of used electronics and to stimulate the electronics recycling economy.
The focus of this initiative is to encourage product design improvements and to implement
new projects (Herat & Agamuthu, 2012).
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2.5 History of e-waste policy: tracing development to the US
The following section follows the issue emergence of e-waste onto the international agenda
and the Basel Convention. Many US states incorporate the regulations and requirement of the
Basel Convention into state law, so it is important to follow the trend from an international
forum with the United Nations to a sub-national policy mechanism in the US states.

2.51 E-waste: issue emergence onto the international agenda
The e-waste movement gained momentum in 2002 when a non-profit, Greenpeace, found
computer dump sites in China and Africa, and released the data in a toxics waste report
(BAN, 2002). Following the release of the report, Greenpeace presented their findings of
illegal dumping of hazardous e-waste at the Basel Convention in Switzerland (J. Puckett,
personal communication). The Basel Convention is an international United Nations treaty
where a network of organizations manages the treatment and movement of hazardous waste
(Basel Convention & UNEP, 2011). As this treaty is extensive – covering now 186 nationstates and the European Union – the topic of e-waste making it onto the agenda was
monumental.
The Basel Convention18 entered into force in 1992 and has had more than two
decades to solidify hazardous waste management regulations. The long-standing framework
for waste management under the Basel Convention allowed for an easy adoption of e-waste

18

The full title for the Basel Convention is otherwise known as, “The Basel Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal” (Basel
Convention & UNEP, 2011).
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under the hazardous waste definition. At the 6th Basel Convention meeting19 in 2002, e-waste
was formally identified by the global community as the most prevalent toxic waste stream
(Herat & Agamuthu, 2012).

2.52 Why is the Basel Convention significant for the US?
The Basel Convention affects the ability of the US to export and import of hazardous and
other wastes with other countries. The transboundary movements of hazardous wastes are
tightly regulated where trade of such material is limited to parties within the convention (the
186 parties). The US is the only developed country that has not yet ratified the convention,
which means that the US cannot legally trade or export hazardous refuse – e-waste in this
case – to other countries20.
As export for more than a few decades was a significant route of disposal for the US,
they were then burdened with millions of pounds of e-waste to manage. As will be discussed
later in this chapter, management of e-waste is problematic because the federal laws do not
recognize the problematic components of e-waste. The Basel Convention could be an initial
driver to e-waste management becoming a priority on the US agenda.

2.53 EPR translation into the EU
The EU has the most progressive e-waste management systems to date. As such, the EU
became the paradigm model for other countries, like the US, to follow.
19

The 6th meeting of the Basel Convention is commonly known as the Basel Convention’s
6th Conference of Parties (COP6). The COP gathers almost every two years and makes
decisions by consensus (Basel Convention & UNEP, 2016).
20
Shipments to countries that are not party to the treaty are illegal unless special
arrangements are legally made. The treaty also requires each nation to produce legislation to
enforce the sound treatment of hazardous waste (UNEP, 2016).
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In contrast to advanced recycling systems like those in Europe, US consumers are
encouraged to donate functional products to organizations like World Computer Exchange,
recycle with an “e-Steward” certified facility, or locating a collection opportunity with a
manufacturer or retailer. Manufacturing companies offer voluntary take-back programs and
offer money back and some retailers, like Staples or Best Buy, take back products for free
(ETBC, 2013). Ultimately, it is best practice to avoid the landfill or illegal dumping.
Individual collection requires each manufacturer to manage their own product. For
example, within the EU, Lenovo® is responsible for collecting, recycling, and processing all
Lenovo® products under and individual producer responsibility (IPR) system.
For instance, multi-national computer manufacturers, i.e. Sony®, Apple®, Microsoft®, are
responsible under the EU system for all the collection, recycling, and disposal of computers
together.

2.54 Conclusion
This chapter gives the general background for the climate of e-waste management on the
global platform and how the issue translated into the US. The following chapter will provide
a literature review on the importance of all stakeholders through the life cycle of e-waste and
how considering consumers, processors, and government could contribute to the efficiency
and effectiveness of e-waste recycling programs.
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Chapter 3: Review of the Literature: Barriers to US EPR programs
This literature review focuses on the condition of EPR programs in the US. Since the early
2000’s, the number of state programs has increased from zero to 23. The e-waste issue is ever
evolving and as more time passes, more states are beginning to follow the trend of other state
EPR programs. The argument in the literature is whether EPR programs in the United States
are successful. The following section tries to understand the current progress of state
programs, but there are limited analyses on state-level programs. To fill in the gap, this
literature reviews extends to EU programs that are well documented to relate existing barriers
and drivers.
The barriers that inhibit effectively implementing EPR policies in the EU may apply
to those of the US. Then, the literature review concludes with a review of the supply chain to
reveal barriers and incentives to key stakeholders in the US by borrowing from a stream of
operations literature that primarily focuses on the processes of actors within a management
system. A supply chain for e-waste follows an electronic product from cradle to grave –
production to disposal. There may be gaps throughout the supply chain that contribute to the
slow or otherwise unsuccessful transfusion of EPR take back policies in the US.
This analysis also borrows from the framework of Gregory & Kirchain (2008) who
designed a framework to characterize the function of all the elements in the electronics
recycling system. The framework dissects stakeholder responsibility for the cash flow,
activities, and modes of processing. The analysis of this thesis contributes to the framework
by adding the behavior of stakeholders in the US and using this analysis to provide policy
recommendations.
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3.1 Current literature on the US state EPR programs
Nash & Bosso (2013) did the most extensive and conclusive research on e-waste EPR
programs in the US. Their study compartmentalizes hazardous waste products – batteries,
paint, mercury thermostats, and e-waste – and follows the trend to the present. Their research
also compiles statistical data of amount of recycled e-waste per state program and it also
includes a background history in the US following EPR programs from the early 1990s on
paint and batteries to e-waste in the 2000s. The conclusion of their research 1) advocate for
the future success of EPR programs for e-waste, 2) suggests that EPR programs have a limit
because states, coalitions, local governments, etc. have not yet collaborated for one
framework approach, and 3) recommends federal legislation.
A large majority of information on EPR policies comes from coalitions like the
Electronic Takeback Coalition (ETBC), non-profits like Product Stewardship Institute (PSI),
National Center for Electronics Recycling (NCER), Basel Action Network (BAN), and
Northeast Recycling Council (NERC), and prominent recyclers like Electronic Recyclers
International (ERI), environmental advocates like League of Conservation Voters (LCV),
Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC), and cooperative forums like the Electronics
Recycling Coordination Clearinghouse (ERCC) that provides a space for agencies to share
information (ETBC, 2013; PSI, 2016; LCV, 2006; SVTC, 2004, ERCC, 2016). All the
organizations and agencies provide current information of legislation status per state and
have an accessible website. Maps of the US with information relevant to e-waste are
available: landfill bans, existing legislation, etc.
The purpose of itemizing all the entities communicates that there is a substantial for
e-waste advocacy, but also that all these separate entities add an additional complexity to the
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US patchwork system. They all strive to compile e-waste information, follow e-waste
legislation, and to recycle e-waste safely, but there are not unified and can be confusing to
consumers, policy makers, and producers.

3.2 Relating to the EU experience: Lessons learned
This section examines a set of factors that contribute to the acceptance of EPR in the EU.
Looking at these set of factors will set the foundation of analyzing the EPR programs in the
US. The EU can offer lessons learned for the US. First, the EU had external drivers such as
lack of land that encouraged waste management. Second, the environmental movement and
history leading up to the emergence of e-waste secured swift action from social acceptance
and political cohesion. Third, the EU passed two blanket laws governing e-waste and
hazardous waste. Fourth, they established organizations called producer responsibility
organizations (PROs) that are specifically responsible for monitoring producer involvement
and funding for take-back programs. Lastly, the EU follows the Basel Convention initiative
that acts as one blanket law for all countries.
Developed countries like the EU – Germany, Norway, and Sweden – have
incorporated take-back legislation and seen robust increases in products recycled per capita at
about 8.8 pounds and rising (Nash & Bosso, 2013). These EPR policies show promise in
increasing recycling rates, collection sites, generating revenue, and diverting e-waste from
landfills (OECD, 2001). The countries in the EU that were the most aggressive were
prompted in a large part by a lack of land for disposal and strong social sector commitment
(European Environment Agency, 2010).
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The keys to their success may also be attributed to the cohesive nature of countries in
the larger political environment leading up to the implementation of the policies. The 1970s
marked a transitionary period for the EU as they gained more member states in the face of an
energy crisis and economic depression (European Union, 2016). In the absence of war, the
EU began allocating money towards revitalizing impoverished areas and towards job
security. It was during this period that the polluter pay principles were adopted into EU laws.
As the EU gained more countries and became more unified through the 1980s, this set the
stage for a unified front to address the environmental concerns of the people. As trade and
commerce opened between member states, the economy encouraged the infiltration of
technology, namely cell phones and the internet to allow for easy communication into the
1990’s (European Union, 2016).
As mentioned previously, the influx of e-waste emerged in 2002 onto the
international agenda at the Basel Convention. In the wake of this meeting, the EU established
two governing instruments, the Directive of Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment
(WEEE Directive) and the Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS). The WEEE
Directive was rooted in EPR and it instituted a foundation that unified all EU members to
responsibly recycle and treat all products by setting recycling targets and holding mass-based
collection without delegating cost to the consumer (European Parliament and Council, 2003).
The second, RoHS, is an added measure to regulate or prohibit the use of toxic substances
inside electronics (Valli, 2002). The EU is a paradigm for the implementation of EPR
policies for e-waste, through take-back legislation.
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Figure 3. Timeline of important dates for the emergence of e-waste.
In the UN...
• Basel Convention

1992

• Ban Amendment

1995

• COP 6

2002

• Mobile Phone Partnership Initiative

2002

• The Partnership for Action on Computing Equipment

2008

In the EU...
• WEEE Directive

2002

• RoHS

2002

Source: European Union, 2016; United Nations, 2016; Herat & Agamuthu,
2012.

The benefit of having established a relationship across member states within the EU at the
time when these two pieces of legislation passed was that transboundary movements of waste
could be tightly regulated under one uniform umbrella. In addition, the cooperation makes
the Directive guidelines salient for manufacturers in the electronics industry, thus promoting
industry compliance. Manufacturers in the electronics industry are a major stakeholder who
have substantial influence when it comes to policy formation. This factor is particularly
important with the US case later, as the US has experienced a significant push back from the
electronics manufacturers. A contributing factor to a lack of participation from the
manufacturers is because the US has a segmented patchwork of states.
Producer responsibility organizations (PROs) are the final factor that contributed to
the successful implementation of take-back programs in the EU. PROs are non-profit, third
party organizations owned by the electronics industry that are municipal level or national
(Quoden, 2016). Typically, the electronics manufacturers are responsible for managing and
financing the product throughout the life cycle under an EPR scheme. A PRO reduces the
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administrative burden on manufacturers by ensuring that the manufacturers follow the
Directive by monitoring the life cycle of a product, in this case, e-waste. Examples of the
duties of a PRO include, but are not limited to: coordinating with local agencies, meeting
targets set by legislation, managing education and outreach with electronics companies to
improve design and minimize waste, compiling data from these companies, and finally
reporting this data to the national agencies (Quoden, 2016). The presence of PROs in the
market effectively reduced recycling costs by encouraging competition (Lee & Shao, 2009).

3.3 Following the chain of waste production
Although there is minimal literature for identifying barriers and incentives for consumers,
producers, and governments in a patchwork system, the following section will borrow from
operations management literature to help understand the state of EPR programs in the US.
Simply, analysts have borrowed from the concept of a supply chain from industry to follow
the thread from production to sale and applied it to the waste stream of electronics.
The supply chain is a linear (or, if materials are recycled, a cyclical) process that links
key stakeholders in the industry. Key stakeholders in the electronics industry are:
federal/state governments, retailers, producers, consumers, and processors. In the US, the
chain begins with the extraction of raw materials, then the manufacturing of the product
followed by the sale at a retailer. The consumer buys the product and then upon disposal the
product goes through a processor (sorting facility or waste management facility), a recycler,
or the landfill. Notably, a supply model is normally transboundary, which is why the ultimate
concern for stakeholders is leakage of e-waste to the Global South.
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Yano & Sakai (2016) say that waste prevention is the primary driver for stakeholders
to work collaboratively because it is cost effectively and benefits all those in the supply
chain. In the case with e-waste and the US, the waste prevention mechanism is EPR and take
back legislation (Kunz, Atasu, Mayers, & Wassenhove, 2014; Atasu, Özdemir, &
Wassenhove, 2013; Zoeteman, Krikke, & Venselaar, 2010). The following sections will
analyze potential barriers and incentives for each stakeholder in the US to comply with a
waste prevention initiatives like EPR.

3.31 Producers
Operations literature, as referenced earlier, anticipates how producers should respond to takeback policies (Atasu & Van Wassenhove, 2011). The main purpose of operations
management literature is understanding how take-back initiatives influence the behavior of
the producer while following stakeholder analysis of this thesis. Incentives for producers
discussed below are 1) to include other stakeholders such as the consumers, governments,
and processors as responsible parties to reduce the burden, 2) to make programs inexpensive
and easy to understand for producers in states that have programs, 3) to follow the trend of
‘green’ products marketing to reach more consumers and increase revenue, and 4) to allow
manufacturers to work together under a collective producer responsibility model (CPR)
where producers hold each other accountable. Barriers include 1) targets that are too stringent
to meet, 2) programs that are complex and expensive, and 3) producers as the primary or only
responsible party.
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Incentives
In the early developmental stages of EPR schemes, the producer was clearly demarcated as
the manufacturer in theory and in practice. Further discussion by Clement and others in the
literature suggest that this still does not adequately identify one party to take final
responsibility because every actor has a role of responsibility (1998). Hypothetically
speaking, a producer could take responsibility for the product design and ensure minimal use
of toxic materials and make the product easy to disassemble. Processors would be
responsible for dismantling and recycling products separately and efficiently. Consumers
would take on responsibility of buying eco-friendly products, taking them to the proper
recycling facility, or not burning or landfilling the products.
Not surprisingly, producers prefer policies including a range of stakeholders to reduce
the logistical and financial burden. In a 2015 survey by Lindhqvist, Tojo, and Tasaki,
respondents21 agreed that “manufacturers of a product” and “importers of a product” were
identified as the responsible in an EPR scheme (p. 27). Notably, within the open-ended
answers, some of the respondents included that “everyone involved in the manufacture, use,
and sale of a product has some responsibility” in mitigating the environmental impacts.
While others simply identified that it is important to highlight that the context of EPR may
vary from “…product to product and country to country depending on the structure of the
market…” (p. 29). Although there are varying opinions on identifying one responsible party,
the fact remains that either one simple definition of a producer or more salient guidelines
about specific producer responsibilities will ease the burden on administrative duties and

21

Respondents of the study consisted of a wide range of stakeholders from producers, to
NGOs, to research institutes and all had varying knowledge of EPR practices (Lindhqvist,
Tojo, and Tasaki, 2015). The respondents for the study were chosen at random.
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enforcement (Nash & Boss, 2013). A potential incentive for producer participation would be
to involve multiple stakeholders to lessen the burden on producers (Clement, 1998).
Since it is not the case in the US for all stakeholders to take responsibility, producers
pushed back on the taking full financial responsibility for their products because the cost of
responsibility from cradle to grave is disproportionately expensive, where producers incur
much of the cost (Atasu, Ozdemir, & Wassenhove, 2013). The main drivers to increase
producer participation is a program that is inexpensive and cost-efficient, and with clear
implementation requirements (Kunz, et al., 2014).
A third incentive for producers is to follow the corporate social responsibility
movement. This is an important factor in influencing producers to modify their operations
processes and business models to accommodate more environmentally friendly standards
(Apple, 2016). For instance, Apple® is known for 100% of their facilities running on
renewable energy. Also, Apple® created a robot named Liam that is designed specifically to
disassemble late model iPhones (Apple, 2016). If improving product design, managing ewaste properly, and recycling would generate more revenue for the producers, the producers
are less likely to resist EPR laws. A paradigm business model is Apple that 1) developed a
robot called Liam to disassemble iPhones generation 6 and newer, 2) offers a voluntary take
back initiative for all their products and offer a cash back incentive, 3) incorporated an ecofriendly product design that uses more recycled materials and less raw materials. Most
manufacturers do not operate in such a way independently, but usually implement a
voluntary take-back program for e-waste to avoid expensive regulations and infrastructure.
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Barriers
Recycling targets are a potential barrier for producers because the targets are too high,
making them expensive and difficult to meet (Nash & Bosso, 2013; Linnel, 2006). Alev,
Agrawal, & Atasu (2016) suggest that increased recycling targets may push manufacturers to
recycle WEEE earlier than necessary just to meet the guidelines.
Another stream of literature paints the picture of the dynamics between national scale
manufacturers in the economic market. Toyasaki, Boyaci, & Verter (2011) conduct a study
arguing that competition reduces product prices for the consumer, yet increases revenue for
the manufacturer via take-back legislation because manufacturers will compete by lowering
their prices. Lower prices encourage consumers to buy products, therefore generating more
revenue. The outcome helps us understand the interactions between manufacturers and
allows us to recognize incentives to manufacturer behavior.
Their work suggests further that monopolies within the market encourage “free
riders”22 that discourage manufacturers from participating. In a different study, Alev,
Agrawal, and Atasu (2016) conclude that manufacturers may only participate in recycling
second-hand goods to meet state requirements rather than considering a reduce and reuse
scheme. Atasu & Subramanian (2011) research shows that producers are more likely to
participate in recycling systems if they are permitted to work together under a collective

22

Free riders are smaller manufacturers that piggy-back on more capable manufacturers to
meet recycling targets (Toyasaki, Boyaci, & Verter, 2011). In a hypothetical example, if all
computer manufacturers in Wyoming are required to meet a 3,000 lbs recycling target, all
computer manufacturers are required to fulfill that in a monopolistic scheme. If Apple and
Sony were the only two computer manufacturers, one would they both would contribute
1,500 lbs. However, a monopolistic scheme would allow Sony to contribute only 100 lbs
because they are smaller and Apple contribute the rest because they have a more efficient
operational capacity. In this case, Sony would be the hypothetical free rider.
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system (CPR systems) because it is cheaper even though statistically the cost sharing has
proven unfair.

3.32 Consumers
Consumers play a crucial role in the e-waste chain. Consumers are crucial to the recycling of
e-waste process because they are at the metaphorical end of the supply chain – the consumer
could either choose recycling to close the loop or choose an end of life disposal of e-waste to
continue the cradle to grave system. Consumers participate in the waste stream by either
dumping their e-waste illegally, storing it, throwing in the garbage, or recycling (Lindhqvist,
Manomaivibool, Tojo, 2007). In addition to convenience, information and low or nonexistent fees. Saphores, Nixon, Ogunseitan, & Shapiro (2006) researched consumers in
California and found that educating the youth would encourage recycling.
For a consumer to recycle responsibly, however, or to take their electronics out of the
attic and to a recycle bin, the collection of e-waste must be convenient, cheap (if not free),
and the consumer must be educated on how to recycle the product. Often there are recycling
events held in local townships yet if consumers are unaware, they will not go. A study done
by Nicolescu & Jula (2016) notes that consumers are more likely to recycle WEEE if: 1)
there are a larger number of collection units, 2) if the consumers are compensated, and 3) if
recycling is visible, attractive, and obvious (Slade, 2012). Bouvier & Wagner (2011) study
the collection habits of televisions and computers in Maine. The study, shows that collection
centers with longer hours and that are open more often will encourage consumers to recycle
due to the increased convenience. Bouvier & Wagner (2011) and GAO (2005) They suggest
as well that a fee for recycling e-waste dissuades consumers from recycling.
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3.33 Retailers
Retailers in the US, like Best Buy or Radioshack, hold a unique place in the e waste chain
literature because they are treated as both a producer and a retailer. This means they are
responsible for providing collection points for e-waste and educating consumers regarding
what constitutes proper recycling practices. They do so not only for the equipment they
produce but also for the goods of other manufacturers like Dell or Apple. The combination of
a retail and manufacturer role, however, creates complexity for these companies who are
playing a double role as producer and retailer in the e-waste chain.
Best Buy runs the largest e-waste program in the US and recently began charging
consumers $25 per TV or monitor returned because the cost of collection and recycling was a
net negative (Waste 360, 2016). The consumer fee could prove as an incentive for other
retailers to begin recycling. Also, the recent rise in gold (a component of e-waste) commodity
prices may encourage recycling as it becomes more profitable (Engel, Stuchtey, &
Vanthournout, 2016). As commodities become more valuable, e-waste becomes more
valuable rather than seen as costly, incentivizing retailers to collect more e-waste, and to
modify the production chain to keep disassembly in mind for product design.
Alev, Agrawal, & Atasu (2016) further discussed the effect of EPR policies on the
secondary markets and durable goods. Secondary markets are retail corporations, like
Amazon, that sell previously used products. Their research found that with durable goods, in
this case electronics, the second-hand or re-use market is important to the retailing industry,
like Amazon or eBay, that allow the opportunity for consumers to make money back on their
products that are still usable. For example, in 2001, eBay sold about one billion dollars of
ICT products alone and 60% of those products were not new (Williams, et al., 2008). With
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more stringent regulations, manufacturers may buy or recycle these goods just to meet
collection targets. The potential interference with the secondary market may prove to be a
barrier for retailers to support in EPR policies.
Further analysis of the take-back legislation on aftermarket activity of goods is
prevalent in the operations literature (Krikke, Bloehmhof-Ruwaard, & Wassenhove, 2003;
Walther & Spengler 2005; Hammond & Buellens, 2007). These analyses are research of deep
economic and statistical theory and provide a detailed account of network design and reverse
logistics. Although beyond the scope of this study, their research contributes to the intricacies
of EPR practice and how it would impact actors in the aftermarket, like retailers.

3.34 E-waste Processors
Processors are companies responsible for disassembling and sorting e-waste products. For
example, processors are typically incentivized by larger volumes of waste as an opportunity
for new business (Gui, et al., 2013). Given that the management scheme varies by state, some
barriers for processors may include competing with manufacturing or other recycling
facilities for higher volumes of waste. There is a delicate balance between large volumes of
waste and volumes of waste that are too large, where the cost for the processor surpasses the
benefit (Pennsylvania DEP, 2015). Another barrier may be the cost of breaking down
hazardous components, like CRTs, or the cost of buying more efficient/larger infrastructure
to handle more volume (Gui, et al., 2103). In Pennsylvania, processors began to shut down
and to simply refuse e-waste because they got overwhelmed with the sheer volume.
Processors can range from large scale that handle volumes from multiple states or
smaller private businesses that only handle materials from nearby municipalities. An
emerging processing sector is the individual. Consumers are realizing that e-waste has
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valuable materials inside that can be sold for profit, i.e. gold or copper or other metal
commodities (personal communication).

3.35 Government/State
The final key stakeholder is states. Many scholars argue that when there is a lack of federal
action at the national level, states move to fill the gap. In terms of a lack of federal regulation
for e-waste this is true (Nash & Bosso, 2013; Elisha, 2010; PSI, 2014; ETBC, 2012). Yet
states face challenges and barriers in crafting e-waste policies and laws in part due to the
regulatory thicket caused by the SWDA and RCRA. As neither of these two federal laws
work to regulate e-waste and contributes to opacity rather than transparency in e-waste
disposal. For example, international export of e-waste is prohibited, however transboundary
movement across states is permitted (BAN, 2016). Landfill disposal in some states is
permitted, and in other states it is not (ERCC, 2016). The fragmented nature of the state
policies and the gaps in the federal laws create jurisdictional barriers in the relationships of
state programs. This gap makes it difficult to track, regulate, and monitor e-waste (Nash &
Bosso, 2013; BAN, 2016).
The incentives for the states to use EPR policies are to push the burden of cost onto
the producers rather than onto the state economy (Nash & Bosso, 2013). With e-waste, state
governments were motivated to respond with EPR laws as the state and municipal economies
began suffering the burden of financial payments for management (Washington DOE, 2016).
These financial concerns from the bottom encouraged states to adopt e-waste programs.
There is a tradition in US politics called cooperative federalism where states serve as
policy or innovation labs. In terms of climate policy, federal inaction prior to the Obama
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administration created a period of active sub-national movement on climate policies by states
and localities. (Rabe, 2008a; Rabe, 2013; Rabe 2008b). In terms of e-waste, state
governments in the US are responsible for monitoring and evaluating implementation and
state level programs. For instance, they ensure that municipalities are offering convenient
collection sites or holding collection events for the consumers.

3.4 Understanding state strategies in lieu of federal support
This thesis borrows from a deep and older tradition of federalism. This thesis climate change
as an interesting parallel that is environmental. trends are seen in other political
environmental arenas with waste or climate change. The states in the US began to respond to
the e-waste issue voluntarily, which parallels trends in climate change.
The US is a federal structure that gives states a lot of leeway. States deliver 90% of
environmental permits and manage most areas of environmental policy, including waste
management (Rabe, 2008b). When comparing state control with federal control over
environmental policy, states are found to be creative and strategic policy innovators in
reaction to environmental problems, where federal involvement can result in failure (Rabe,
2008a; Rabe, 2008b). As happened with the case in of Washington State and Oregon in the
2000s, e-waste policies advanced quickly with a bill being passed and implemented in close
to 2 years. Again, as seen with climate change policy evolution, states started to become
actors in the international climate change realm and began to work with Canadian provinces
and the EU (Rabe, 2007). Maine and Washington are two states that reflect what the EU has
done with e-waste (Rabe, 2007). State achievements are supported by extensive public
advocates for local concerns, the growth of advocacy groups and state agencies that generate
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novel ideas, networks of environmental professionals across states encourage policy
diffusion, and all states can pass their own legislation (Rabe, 2008a).
When climate change initiatives were ignored by the federal government, states
stepped in with pilot programs to test new ideas that were then transformed later into state
legislation. These state level policy initiatives were effective and successful because states
had the opportunity to tailor the legislation to the unique needs of the state (Selin &
VanDeveer, 2009). Rabe (2007) reports that it is likely for states to seek partnership together
when the federal government fails to respond. Just as with the more recent case with lowlevel radioactive waste, states like Washington State, Nevada, and South Carolina refused to
become permanent disposal sites and pressured the government for federal legislation (Rabe,
2013). In response, states were instead encouraged to form state coalitions and cooperate
(Rabe, 2013). Very similar outcomes are to be expected with e-waste policy innovation.

3.5 Manufacturer-led versus state-led
There are two types of regulatory cultures of EPR in the US: manufacturer-led programs and
state-led programs (ERCC, 2016; PSI, 2016; ETBC, 2013). The EPA encouraged these
structures in the 2000s at the federal level, but now they are implemented at the state level or
voluntarily by manufacturers (EPA, 2017). In either manufacturer or state-operated systems,
the manufacturer can operate and fund the e-waste management system or the state can
(Atasu, Ozdemir, Van Wassenhove, 2032). Atasu, Ozdemir, Van Wassenhove (2013) show
that both structures effect policy implementation choices and further that ‘operational details
matter’ (p. 19). Simply, both models are theoretically functional and would successfully
protect the environment and process e-waste. They argue that ‘operational details matter’
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meaning that the fluidity and cohesiveness between all stakeholders throughout the life cycle
is crucial to the success of the program and the not just the producers. Notably, operating
costs incentivized all stakeholders – including producers – to participate in the program
(Atasu, Ozdemir, Van Wassenhove, 2013).
Funding streams determine divide programs into public and private. In the public
model, the state governments or local governments control the finances to ensure proper and
responsible disposal of e-waste. In the private model, the manufacturers manage the financial
flows. An additional responsibility of the lead stakeholder is guideline requirements, such as
recycling targets or collection sites.
There is little literature on the debate between which program is more efficient or
more successful with state programs, likely due to policies being in a fledging state and more
data is needed for an adequate study. Atasu, et al. (2009) argue that state-led models are more
effective at establishing higher recycling targets and placing more collection sites because the
state governments are more responsible at holding manufacturers accountable. Manufacturerled models, they argue, typically lack the incentive to set high standards because they are
more costly. In the same vein of thought, state-led models are thought to have stringent
regulations accompanied by strict enforcement. On the other hand, it is argued that
manufacturers will improve the design for e-waste over time to minimize costs of
management since they are solely responsible for financing (Gui, et al., 2013).

3.6 Conclusion
The literature review has laid the foundation for analyzing the behavior of key stakeholders
in the e-waste industry through the supply chain in the following cases of Maine and
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Washington. As mentioned previously, factors for e-waste recycling systems vary greatly
from state to state and across regions.
The conclusion of the research of Nash & Bosso (2013) 1) advocated for the future
success of EPR programs for e-waste, 2) suggested that EPR programs have a limit because
states, coalitions, local governments, etc. have not yet collaborated for one framework
approach, and 3) recommended federal legislation.
The assessment of the supply chain in the US was done to understand why the EPR
programs have limits by identifying incentives and barriers for key stakeholders throughout
the supply chain: producers, consumers, processors, retailers, and state/local governments.
Incentives for the producers and retailers include 1) to include other stakeholders such as the
consumers, governments, and processors as responsible parties to reduce the burden, 2) to
make programs inexpensive and easy to understand for producers in states that have
programs, 3) to follow the trend of ‘green’ products marketing to reach more consumers and
increase revenue, and 4) to allow manufacturers to work together under a collective producer
responsibility model (CPR) where producers hold each other accountable. Barriers include 1)
targets that are too stringent to meet, 2) programs that are complex and expensive, and 3)
producers as the primary or only responsible party.
Incentives for consumers are accessible collection sites that have long hours of
operation, collection sites are attractive and communicate proper education about acceptable
items. Any additional costs or inconvenience will drive consumers away from proper
recycling.
An analysis of the EU also offered lessons learned, such as: 1) the EU had external
drivers such as lack of land that encouraged waste management. 2) the environmental
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movement and history leading up to the emergence of e-waste secured swift action from
social acceptance and political cohesion. 3) the EU passed two blanket laws governing ewaste and hazardous waste. 4) they established organizations called producer responsibility
organizations (PROs) that are specifically responsible for monitoring producer involvement
and funding for take-back programs. Lastly, the EU follows the Basel Convention initiative
that acts as one blanket law for all countries.
Section 3.3 offered insight into the trends of e-waste policy by borrowing from an
existing literature of federalism in attempt to parallel climate policy with e-waste policy
trends. Just as with climate, it is expected for states to take initiative when the federal
government refuses to act or cuts funding, as is the case with most environmental situations
in the US. Expected outcomes for e-waste policy development is for states to form multistate alliances and for states to begin to operate as independent nations and work
internationally with other countries, such as the EU.
Lastly, the literature on manufacture-led vs state-led programs indicates that both
program structures have the potential to successful manage e-waste. More important factors
are 1) ensuring that the stakeholders are cooperating and 2) assessing state-level
environments to identify individual needs. The following chapter will dissect two states,
Maine and Washington, to identify similar trends (or differences) in stakeholder
participation. These two separate cases should offer insight into the efficacy of state-run
programs and offer some lessons learned.
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Chapter 4: E-waste Supply Chains in Washington and Maine: Case Studies
The following chapter examines two states considered ‘best practice’ states for e-waste:
Washington and Maine. Each case is set up to follow the supply chain of e-waste to identify
potential gaps within the chain that contribute to inefficiencies in the state e-waste EPR
programs. EPR programs, as explained in the background and literature review, may be most
efficient under certain circumstances such as having support from the electronics industry,
effective lobbying campaigns, and setting strict recycling targets under state-operated
programs. The following cases illuminate how Maine and Washington accomplished
obtaining support from the electronics industry, for example, by analyzing their incentives
for cooperating. The chapter will identify key stakeholders for each state and then examine
the effect of state-operated efforts on those key stakeholders of Maine and Washington, along
with a set of mini cases, to assess the successes and failures of take-back legislation in
collecting and recycling e-waste.

4.1 Washington State

4.11 Basic summary of e-waste in Washington State
The Washington State e-Cycle program gained a good track record for its recycling rate, the
amount of e-waste it recycled over a short period of time, and the turn-over of passing an ewaste law. The Electronic Product Recycling Act was passed in just one year and in just a
few short years recycled over 300 million pounds of e-waste (Washington DOE, 2010). The
following figure shows the development of the bill at a glance.
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Figure 4. Significant dates in the formation of Washington’s present law.
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Source: Electronics TakeBack Coalition, 2016; SB 6428

4.12 The Electronic Product Recycling Act and the e-Cycle program details
Washington was an early mover, passing e-waste legislation in 2006, the Electronic Product
Recycling Act (EPCRA). The Act required manufacturers to meet recycling targets, provide
outreach and education to consumers, and fund recycling and disposal of electronics.
Enacting it by 2007 began to form a council of manufacturers and set up collection sites. This
was furthered by the addition of the e-cycle program by 2009 (Washington DOE, 2010).
Under this law, Washington has reached some of the highest collection rates, almost 6
pounds per capita, in the US and continues to evolve by expanding its product scope (Nash &
Bosso, 2013). The high collection rates are partially attributed to the strong participation of
the electronics industry in the port cities of Washington State, establishing collection sites
even in rural areas, government support, and a persuasive presence of NGOs, like the Basel
Action Network (BAN).
The EPRCA launches a new management system for covered electronic products
(CEPs) and to encourage a more recyclable product design that used less toxic materials for
CEPs (SB 6428). The EPCRA initiated the e-Cycle Washington electronic product recycling
program as the new management system that requires the take back and recycling of e-waste
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products, education, and collection sites and garbage pick-up. The EPRCRA designates
manufacturers as responsible for funding the program, however all stakeholders must
participate for the program to properly function.
The EPCRA requires free collection, transportation, and recycling services for
specified covered electronic products23 (CEPs) as outlined in Table 1. Manufacturers must
submit a plan to collect, transport, and recycle CEPs to the state Department of Energy.
Although the state sets the standard the EPRCA has built in flexibility for manufactures to
comply. The manufacturers may choose to submit either a voluntary plan, one that is created
by the council of manufacturers and approved by the government (DOE). The plan allows
manufacturers to either work collectively to fund, collect, and handle e-waste to meet targets
or individually. Otherwise, manufacturers must adhere to the standard plan of the legislation,
but both plans must be approved by the DOE.
The standard plan – by the state – defines where and how much e-waste is recycled
and by whom. In short, the standard plan in Washington is based on a return-share scheme
where the manufacturer is responsible for a certain weight percentage recovered of CEPs
based on brand. For any CEPs that are not branded, all manufacturers split the cost of
recovery. For example, the total pounds collected for the 2015 was 604, 949 lbs. The target
must be met by all manufacturers that participate in the plan. Sony Electronics took back the
most products identified by brand, therefore they were accountable for a larger share of the
costs (Washington DOE, 2016). If Sony were to introduce a voluntary plan, they would be

23

Washington State Senate defines a “covered electronic product” (CEP) as a “…cathode ray
tube or flat panel computer monitor…a desktop computer, laptop or portable computer; or a
cathode tube or flat panel television having a viewable area greater than four inches…”
(Department of Ecology, 2010).
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responsible for their market share, so if Sony sold 15% of the product in the market, then
Sony is responsible for an equivalent percentage of the payment.

Table 4. Recipients, CEPs, and collection methods under the e-Cycle Washington program
Program Recipients
Covered Products
Available Collection Methods

Households, Charities, Small Businesses, School
Districts and Schools, Small governments24,
Special purpose districts25, and Charities
Televisions, Computers, Computer Monitors,
Portable Laptops (including tablet computers), Ereaders, and Portable DVD Players
Curbside Recycling
Collection Bins
Mail-back systems
Collection events

Source: SB 6428; Department of Ecology, 2016

The regulatory framework explained above gives the general overview of how the program
works under the law in Washington. Among all the stakeholders, the following section
highlights key players like manufacturers, the state governments, retailers, and consumers
and their responsibilities.

Stakeholder Responsibilities
Under Washington’s law, the DOE is the state level governing agency that has jurisdiction
over the e-Cycle program. To sell products within Washington, all stakeholders must register
with the DOE. However, in partnership with the DOE, the law created an “Authority” that is
24

Small governments are defined under SB 6428 as any government agency within
Washington “…with a population less than 50,000 or a county…with a population less than
125,000.”
25
Special purpose districts are separate from a city, town, or county government and they
provide services like “…electricity, fire protection, flood control, health, housing, irrigation,
parks and recreation, library, water-sewer service and more recently stadiums, convention
centers, and entertainment facilities that are not otherwise available from city or county
governments.” (SB 6428).
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composed of manufacturing representatives called the Washington Materials Management
and Financing Authority (WMMFA). The WMMFA is the public body made up of eleven
participating manufacturers that administers the program finances (RCW 70.95N.280).
Among the board members are representatives from Dell, Lenovo, HP, Apple, VIZIO, LG,
and Samsung (WMMFA, 2016). Both the WMMFA and the DOE implement the standard
plan. As discussed, below in addition the flexibility mechanism the WMMFA was an
important incentive for private sector support for the e-waste waste law of Washington.
The WMMFA is also responsible for collecting funds from participating
manufacturers to finance the system. The board of directors and is comprised of 11
participating manufacturers with five positions reserved for the top ten leading brand owners
(70.95N.290). These five positions are held for leading brand owners because the WEEE
recycling system is based on market shares and return shares. Market shares represent the
percentage of recycling each manufacturer is responsible for funding.
The state participates in the enforcement of the standard plan by overseeing the
WMMFA council and they also aid in promoting CEP recycling; however, the state
government designates manufacturers as the governing entity over the flow of finances and
products (Gui, et al., 2013). This gives manufacturers flexibility within an otherwise stringent
program.
The flow of finances is shown in Figure 1 of all finances go the “Authority”,
otherwise known as the WWMFA, and is recycled through all entities that handle CEPs. it is
important to recognize that the WWMFA gives the manufacturers freedom to create their
own program and coordinate with other manufacturers in an otherwise stringent law.
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Figure 5. Flows of finances and products of WEEE through the electronic recycling system

Source: Gui, et al., 2013
Products flow typically from the manufacturers, to retailers, to consumers and then are
managed through other entities to properly collect, strip apart, re-manufacturer, and recycle.
Destination sites could include landfills and incinerators from improper disposal by the
consumes into household waste. There are two other entities, retailers and refurbishers, that
are two alternative destinations for WEEE.
The potential key to the success of the program is that Washington’s program
incorporates responsibilities for multiple stakeholders into the details of the program:
including collectors, transporters, and processors. Each of these actors in the waste supply
chain are required to register with the DOE. The key stakeholders and their responsibilities
are laid out in Table 3.

Table 5. Key players throughout the lifecycle CEPs.
Stakeholders

Responsibilities

Consumers

Return CEPs to a collection location
Be responsible
Sell products from registered manufacturers only
Educate consumers upon purchase of CEPs

Retailers
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Manufacturers

State Government
(DOE)

WMMFA

Pay a fee to a DOE to cover administration costs
Pay collectors and processors for services
Provide collection sites for every county within the state
Renew/update plan every five years
Participate in a standard plan or independent plan
Finance program implementation
Oversee financing operations
Encourage CEP recycling with educational campaigns
Registering manufacturers
Approving independent plans
Delineate performance standards for collectors, transporters, and processors
Quantifying return shares for manufacturers
Monitoring the WMMFA
Consumer education
Manage the standard plan
Collect funds from participating manufacturers to cover operational and logistical costs

Source: SB 6428; Gui, et al., 2013
Stakeholder Interaction
To look at the supply chain of e-waste within Washington state, this section provides a layout
of stakeholders under Washington’s law. The DOE is the state department that has
jurisdiction over the e-Cycle program. Much of their power is relieved by the manufacturers
as the law created a quasi-public council called the “Authority”.
Retailers are not included in the figure, but are an integral piece to the flow of
finances and products. Retailers are often both a manufacturer and a retailer, where the
company sells products from multiple manufacturers, but also sells its own brand. Retailers
can also set up collection sites if needed.
Refurbishers are companies or non-profits that recycle and reuse disposed goods that
are still functional. With the rapid development of technology, many of the products
discarded in the trash are still relatively useful. These companies also recover damaged
equipment for re-use.
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4.13 How does the e-Cycle program work?
Washington’s e-waste recycling is meant to be transparent and easy to follow. One strategy
to engage consumers is the state’s website for all stakeholders to determine the respective
responsibilities and how to fulfill their requirements. In theory, consumers, manufacturers,
retailers, and processors can access the site and determine where and how to recycle their
products or what each of their responsibility are under the law26.
A preliminary analysis from 2012 of the e-cycling program sponsored by the King
County Solid Waste Division and the Western Product Stewardship Collaborative (WPSC)
revealed that the e-cycling program generated about 140 net new jobs in the first 10 months
of operation and the report showed efficiency and collection success (2012). The progress of
the program is based on pounds of electronics recycled and amount of collection bins
dispersed in counties throughout the state since the program start date in 2009.
Given the data of recycled electronics, it is unclear whether recycling of electronics
has increased because of the e-Cycle program or if recycling rates rose simply because
availability of EEE rose. In 2009, more than 22,000 tons of electronic were recycled and by
2013 it increased to just over 51,000 tons (Washington DOE, 2016). However, total solid
waste disposal decreased after e-Cycle program began, which could potentially show that ewaste was diverted from the landfill.
It is important to show that the e-waste recycling business could generate jobs and
revenue for elected officials to maintain voter support and for the state to prove to the
industry that there is an opportunity for profit. It essential for environmental interests and the

26

Ultimately, any voluntary or mandatory plan must provide collection services in every county and city with a
population greater than 10,000 (70.95N.280, 2006). No independent plans have been approved through the
DOE (Gui, et al., 2013).
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state to develop the argument that e-waste recycling is viable and has the potential for profit
in the US because competing alternatives for e-waste recycling are raw material extraction,
disposal, or export. There are over 400 manufacturers involved in the program, to date (Gui,
et al., 2013). Table 6 shows the available recycling rates per capita of Washington’s e-Cycle
program.

Table 6. Per Capita rates of e-Waste before and after the e-Cycle program.
Per Capita

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Electronic Waste
Recycled

5.24

6.66

7.60

9.20

11.22

14.94

Electronic Waste
Disposed

15.42

14.11

13.80

13.20

13.16

13.29

Electronic Waste
Generated

20.66

20.77

21.40

22.40

24.37

28.24

4,978,496

4,613,329

4,548,275

4,377,843

4,396,880

4,485,333

Total MSW
Disposed (tons)

Source: Department of Ecology, 2016.

4.14 Challenges and benefits to implementing the program in Washington
The State of Washington, hereafter referred to as Washington, is in the Pacific Northwest of
the US and is bordered by Canada, Idaho, and Oregon. Washington is a large state that is
66,455 mi2 and is mostly rural with its most dense populations in coastal metropolitan areas
like Snohomish and King County. (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015; Access Washington, 2010).
The eastern portion of the state has a mountainous terrain for most of its geography and
significant of land with low population density open for agriculture and farming. The
geography of Washington poses a challenge for e-waste recycling initiatives to reach
outlying counties. The e-Cycle program is based on reaching a target number of collection
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sites rather than reaching a weight target for e-waste, but dissemination to rural areas is still
difficult and transportation expense is still a barrier.
Over the past few years, the state economy has grown more robust with an increasing
demand for consumer products and electronics. (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). Per the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA), Washington’s GDP was $386.335 billion USD ranking
Washington 14th in terms of US state economies. The strongest industries in Washington are
total trade, transportation, health, education, and manufacturing. Retail trade alone grew by
0.62% in Washington and contributed to its steady economic growth (2015). The point here
is that the economy of Washington still grew even after implementing the e-Cycle program,
which is typically viewed as a very expensive process.
Another contribution to the success of the Washington e-Cycle program lies in the
diversity of state interests. Historically, Washington has had a strong environmental
constituency from environmental advocacy groups and from government officials while
supporting an economy that is heavily based on fossil fuels, health, education, trade and
durable/non-durable goods manufacturing (Washington Environmental Council, 2016). Even
though these interests are often competing (fossil fuels vs. environmental advocacy), the
diversity in Washington may lend itself to more flexibility and so makes the state more able
to adapt to economic shifts.
One of the last factors to the program success is the strong presence of the electronics
industry. Rather than being a barrier, the state swiftly moved to incorporate manufacturers
onto a council and doing such contributed to the e-waste bill passing. The state’s information
and communication technologies (ICT) sector is composed of roughly 8,610 firms and
generates about 238,900 jobs and contributes a combined $18 billion to the state economy
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(Department of Commerce, 2016). In 2006, the Washington state legislature called for
research and pushed forward an electronic waste recycling program to ebb landfill disposal
of e-waste. After research on WEEE in Washington, the Washington Department of Ecology
recommended a manufacturer-funded processing system based on the electronic industry’s
large stake in product market share (SB 6428). Large corporations like Apple, Hewlett
Packard, Lenovo, Microsoft, and Samsung have manufacturing facilities in Washington (HP,
2015). Microsoft has headquarters in Washington (Microsoft, 2016). The strength of the ICT
sector and the demand for electronic products put Washington in the unique position
regarding how its advanced technology sector engages in handling e-waste. What is
interesting in this case is that in a state with powerful producers and high tech companies, the
state government passed a state law to manage e-waste sustainably.

4.15 Issue emergence in Washington
The electronic recycling bill took effect on July 1, 2006, per the Revised Code of
Washington (RCW) section 70.95N.902. The then Washington Governor Christine Gregoire
signed the law in 2009 where she only vetoed Section 26 that specified stringent regulations
on international exports of e-waste and ship waste (SB 6426, 2009). The Bill (you need to
say briefly what is does or why it is comprehensive)
To understand the emergence of the bill, there are four main drivers leading to the roll
out: a long history of environmental interest groups (i.e. government officials, universities,
and NGOs), the emergence of hazardous waste issues, negligence from the federal
government, and illegal dumping and export of WEEE in developing countries.
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History of Environmental Interest Groups
Washington has strong political will to support environmental issues and the safety of public
health at both the state and local levels. The Senate and the House has sided with
environmental concerns for more than fifteen years (League of Conservation Voters, 2009).
In addition, King County and the City of Seattle are famous for climate and environmental
focus with strong collaboration from Universities. The University of Washington has a long
history since the 1970’s in support of recycling (2016). In the early 2000s UW conducted a
pilot program Smart Cans to divert more than 30% of waste from landfills and by 2007 the
University introduced an e. Media recycling program that providing recycling bins for
electronic waste across campus to reach overall recycling rates of 70% (2016). Just last year
in 2015, UW received over $50,000 from the Green Seed Fund Project to pilot new strategies
on e-waste management (University of Washington, 2015).
A few environmental advocacy groups dedicated to e-waste issues in Seattle emerged
in the early 2000s. Included in the list are other environmental groups, charities, and national
coalitions that are dedicated to e-waste have evolved in conjunction with Washington’s
initiatives. A set of NGOs and coalitions focusing on e-waste were important into pushing
legislation through the state assembly.

Emergence of Hazardous Waste Issues
Two years preceding the emergence of the e-waste issue in 2004, the Seattle Precautionary
Principle Working Group released a white paper introducing a precautionary principle
framework for mad cow disease, asbestos, and benzene for the City of Seattle and King
County. Environmental health advocates, the EPA, representatives from the health sector,
and investment shareholders all participated in the working group and provided multiple
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perspectives on the benefits of pollution prevention over risk assessment. This set the stage
for later EPR policies as EPR policy is fundamentally a precautionary principle. These issues
catalyzed a movement among researchers, policy makers, and the public toward a new
framework to manage potentially hazardous substances. The precautionary principle is not
explicitly written in the law, but the law acts to prevent waste rather than react to a hazard.
Behind the scenes, and in part leading up to Washington banning all flame retardants,
was the EPA acting to deregulate toxics reporting in 2005, as with most efforts under the
Bush administration, environmental interests fell to the wayside (Dinnage, 2006). States, like
Washington, strongly opposed the new rule to reduce monitoring of toxics. States feared they
would “…lose federal funding for several state and regulatory agency toxic reporting
programs…” as Meghan Purvis from the US Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) stated
(as cited in Dinnage, 2006, p. 11). The state government even sought funding for e-waste
programs through producer responsibility programs (“Manufacturing & Technology News”,
2006). The issue with the hazardous risk from e-waste was only compounded when state-led
government programs could not find funding to support programs, so manufacturer funded
programs were a feasible option when other solid waste management fees were at threshold
(“Manufacturing & Technology News”, 2006).
As a response to the EPA rule controversy, Washington passed a bill. The reason
behind the bill was in part a response to mitigate pollution from PBDE’s and in part to
maintain a prevent change in toxics reporting at the state level even if the EPA reduced
reporting. In 2007, Washington was the first state in the US to pass a ban on all flame
retardants (Washington Toxics Coalition, 2007). This is an example of the environmentally
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progressive nature of Washington and an example of a driving factor for the e-waste
legislation, as PBDEs are found within the plastics of electronics.

Relaxed Federal Regulation and State Involvement
The story with PBDEs is linked to another driver of the e-waste bill: lax federal standards. In
2005, the EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson endorsed a rule that decreased the frequency
of reporting to once a year to once every two years for PBDEs (Dinnage, 2006). For many
states this infringed upon the viability of their toxic right-to-know laws because reporting
once every two years is an extended period to be uninformed.
In a response to lax regulatory leadership shown by the federal government, Washington
(and other states) responded with state-led environmental initiatives that banned the use of
PBDEs in 2006. This effort was modeled on the EU Directive model for Restriction of the
Use of Certain Hazardous Substances (RoHS) that bans specific hazardous substances in
EEE (Hsiao, Reinhard, & Linden, 2007).
As discussed in chapter 2 about the emergence of the e-waste issue, state management
of e-waste also grew in lieu of federal involvement. In the case with PBDE, the federal
government sought to relax monitoring under the then Bush administration. In the case with
e-waste, the federal government resists acknowledging the urgency of the issue. Although
different, both cases have minimal participation from the federal government drove states to
handle e-waste fitting with the needs of that state setting. Since Washington state already had
the laid ground work for PBDE chemicals, when the bill for e-waste was introduced, (SB
6428 & HB 2662) the bill passed quickly is just one year. There were 35 sponsors from each
branches of the government (2006).
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Surprisingly, resistance from the electronics industry was not strong enough to
impede the e-waste law. In a report of the Technology Administration, manufacturers
opposed state-led, producer responsibility initiatives because they interfere with their ability
to “compete and innovate” because high compliance costs and inefficient models
(Technology Administration, 2006, p. 3). However, due to the involvement of other
economic majorities like the health sector and NGOs, the bill passed (Technology
Administration, 2006; BAN, 2016).

Illegal Waste Export and Developing Countries
Illegal export still exists of CEPs to developing countries. Developing countries have a
strong, cheap market for WEEE from developed countries that outcompetes with that of
recyclers from the United States (Basel Action Network, 2008). In 2009, the EPA reported
illegal exports from Washington to Hong Kong. Despite the federal 2011 Responsible
Electronics Recycling Act, illegal exports still occur in Washington. Washington State has
major port cities, such as Seattle, where many shipments of e-waste are likely to exit. The
ban on exporting e-waste means that tons of e-waste remains on US soil. To curb illegal
export, careless dumping or improper disposal of e-waste, Washington passed e-waste law,
but it may not be efficient enough.
A news release in 2013 stated that in U.S. exports of used CEPs was valued at nearly
$1.5 billion dollars in 2011, as reported by the US International Trade Commission (USITC).
Executive Recycling, Inc. was fined $4.5 million in 2013 for illegal export of e-waste
(Beveridge & Diamond). This presents Washington with a dilemma given that illegal waste
often leaves their domestic ports.
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When it comes to the e-waste bill, it cannot place a ban or regulate exports of e-waste
without federal assistance. The Governor stated in a veto message that the State of
Washington cannot ban export of e-waste to other countries because it lacks the authority to
do so (Gregoire, C., 2006). This authority would come from the Department of Commerce of
further federal legislation.

4.16 Conclusion
The Washington model shows promise for the future of WEEE, demonstrating a gradual
increase in recycling rates over time, substantial stakeholder involvement, and a program
with the capacity to expand its product scope. The benefit of the state-led model for
Washington is that it required manufacturers to participate and coordinate with other
stakeholders that would otherwise not contribute to the system or ‘free rider’ problem. The
“free rider” problem is where other (usually smaller) manufacturers fail to contribute to
recycling take back efforts by letting the other manufacturers handle the burden. For
example, in a collective system where say HP, Lenovo, and Microsoft were collectively
responsible for meeting a recycling target of 10 computers a day, HP and Microsoft may
meet that target and Lenovo would not contribute anything, thus the free-riding.
The Council of State Governments (CSG) is the only national organization that
collaborates between all branches of the state government to facilitate public policy (CSG,
2016). CSG looked to Washington as a paradigmatic model over because it is comprehensive
and targeted hazardous substances through e-waste management (Hsiao, et al., 2007).
Around the time of the Washington bill, 20 other states attempted to push a bill through,
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however, Washington was the only one bill enacted seemingly because it was the only bill
with a financial plan for recycling programs (“E-waste regulations advance”, 2006).
Washington has overcome barriers like transportation in rural areas and large
quantities of e-waste, that other states have viewed as too costly or inconvenient. Washington
could overcome these barriers because many stakeholders participated in building the
infrastructure and there is a strong presence of supporters from the electronics industry to
cover the financial costs for transportation, collection, and processing. Further, Washington
has a strong infrastructure base to recycle large quantities of e-waste.
Although there is significant collaboration and support for the e-Cycle program,
Washington still experiences some push-back from retailers. Often a retailer is considered
both a manufacturer and a retailer because they make their own products, as well as, sell
products of other name brands. These interest groups push for voluntary programs in the face
of stringent regulations because they are less costly and more convenient. These retailers
include Best Buy, Radioshack, and Staples and retailers are the only entity that recycles
peripheral computer equipment not covered under the program for free. Best Buy is fighting
these initiatives not only because it is too costly and inconvenient, but also since Best Buy
often will bear the financial burden of more than the market share.
Key lessons from WA state are that outreach and education is important to
disseminate information even to rural areas. Outreach seems effective with a transparent
website that communicates the amounts of recycled e-waste, as well as, outlined
responsibilities for manufacturers, consumers, and other stakeholders. A second lesson
learned from WA state is that collection sites from rural areas or consistent collection events
pulls in consumers to participate in recycling of e-waste. Third, WA is already an
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environmentally minded state with the public, academic universities, and businesses in favor
of taking care of the environment. Lastly, the state encouraged the cooperation of the
electronics industry, which is fundamental for the program to function. For WA, developing
a council for manufacturers to manage their own funding and programs worked best. Despite
the progress of the WA state e-Cycle program, major port cities of Washington still struggle
with illegal e-waste export and improper disposal because ‘third party’ recyclers or
processors simply do not have the infrastructure or money to afford disassembly of the large
quantities of e-waste.

4.2 Oregon & Canada
The bilateral support around Washington is another factor that contributes to the successful
implementation and enforcement of its e-Cycle program. Oregon and Canada have similar
interests to Washington. Oregon implemented an e-Cycle program in 2009, the same year as
Washington, but it is entirely manufacturer operated (ERCC,2016). Oregon and Washington
have together developed mutual coalitions to manage the transport of e-waste across borders.
Further, the laws and ideal cover similar product scope for the same entities that provides
consistency and clarity for consumers, manufacturers, and processors. The fact that Oregon
and Washington have passed similar laws around the same time reinforces enforcement
operations. This way, Washington and Oregon do not have to struggle with the logistical
stumbling blocks of interstate commerce or struggle with liability. For instance, when two
bordering states have differing laws over who is responsible for the financial burden of
disposal, waste usually gets dumped illegally because there is a loophole that no party wants
to fill (Lepawsky, 2012).
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The case with Oregon is similar in Canada. Canada, bordering Washington to the
North, has also furthered development on e-waste legislation since 2003 and recycles seven
types of covered electronic products (Lepawsky, 2012). In theory, the combination of the
three entities – Oregon, Washington, and Canada – should yield simpler logistics to monitor
and track the transboundary flows of e-waste. Lepawsky (2012) reports on the contrary, that
the patchwork of state-level systems leads to jurisdictional confusion. While on the surface
the three regions would seem to cooperate to ease the regulatory burden, the result is just the
opposite. The small variations in the definition of what constitutes “garbage” or “junk”, for
instance, has caused garbage to be dumped just because no one took responsibility. The
patchwork system of EPR programs has led to a downfall of states regulating transboundary
waste flows (Lepawsky, 2012).

4.3 Maine

4.31 Background on Maine
Maine is a relatively small state with much of the state being rural leaving the most densely
populated cities to the east coast. Until the election of Governor LePage in 2012, Maine was
a leader in environmental issues, but also it is heavily dependent on manufacturing, mining,
agriculture, and public services (Netstate, 2016) Maine was the first state to adopt an EPR
law in 2004 to manage e-waste in the US within household waste streams. Electric and
electronic equipment (EEE) ranks second in the manufacturing sector for Maine economy
(Netstate, 2016). The e-waste law, hereafter referred to as Maine’s Electronic Waste
Recycling Law, proposed to reduce the economic burden on municipalities by shifting
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responsibility towards the producers, in contrast to Washington State (38 M.R.S.A. §1610).
Maine’s framework is unique in that the cost of transportation, collection, and recycling is
shared across manufacturers, consumer, and municipalities to handle e-waste. The
‘framework’ idea is meant to extend a similar framework to nearby states (Nash & Bosso,
2013). Two years later in 2006, the State implemented the new e-waste program called the
Extended Producer Responsibility Program for E-waste Recycling.
In the wake of this program, Maine experienced a relatively rapid decrease in e-waste
disposal in landfills and an increase in recycling rates through the program (Wagner, 2009).
More than 14 million pounds of covered electronic products27 (CEPs) were recycled in the
first three years of operation and rose to more than 66 million by 2015 (Maine DEP, 2016).
Maine, therefore, became the paradigmatic model for other states interested in the
collective responsibility mechanism that spread the cost among all stakeholders rather than
solely among producers. In addition, Maine is the most established state in terms of EPR
policy for CEPs in the US and has 10 years of experience and data.

4.32 How has the program worked?
The new system changed the framework to an in-management system of waste where end-oflife products are recycled for initial use rather than planning for landfill disposal. Figure 3
shows the management of e-waste under the new program.

27

Covered electronic products (CEPs) are defined by Maine Law as “…computer central
processing units, a desktop printer, a video game console, a cathode ray tube, a cathode ray
tube device, a flat panel display, or similar video display device with a screen that is greater
than 4 inches measured diagonally…” (38 M.R.S.A. §1610).
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Figure 6. The new program system under the Maine e-waste law.

Source: Wagner, 2009
Maine’s recycling and collection rates remain some of the strongest relative to other states in
the US, but rates relative to Maine alone have plateaued at just over 8 million pounds since
2013 (Maine DEP, 2016). The recycling program expanded the product scope over the past
few years, but still the recycling rates remain stagnant at about 8 million pounds, which hints
that Maine has potentially reached a peak recycling capacity (Maine DEP, 2016),

4.33 History of Maine’s e-waste Law and issue emergence
Maine led many other states passing an e-waste law in 2004 and progressed the law grew
significantly over time. After just three years, the program collected 14 million pounds of ewaste and expanded its scope from four products to twelve.
Maine has a history of having a strong environmental stewardship, as they are known
to draw in tourists for whale watching, eating fresh lobster, and enjoying the pristine scenery
of the coast. In the early 2000s, Maine’s economy was stagnant, the manufacturing sector
was shrinking, and unemployment rates were rising (Bell & Burke, 2005).
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Around the same time in the early 2000s, the e-waste bill was introduced in 2006 in
response to the previously passed landfill disposal ban of cathode ray tubes (CRTs). The ban
was passed by the state government. Maine’s Department of Environmental Protection
needed an alternative disposal system for CRTs that did not disproportionately impact
consumers and burden municipalities (“Bangor Daily News”, 2004). Legislators introduced a
producer responsibility bill soon after for all CEPs. There was little to no manufacturer
resistance to this bill as manufacturers initially saw the bill to make money since Maine
government began importing waste from other states. Additionally, environmental lobbyists
and the public also viewed the new bill as an opportunity to protect the environment and
stimulate the economy. (“Bangor Daily News”, 2004).
The economic decline in Maine is mostly attributed to a decrease in durable-goods
manufacturing with the real estate, construction and government industries performing
substantially (Murphy, 2015). To address this economic stagnation, then Governor Baldacci
(2003-2011) and leading corporations in Maine like Apple, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Dell, and
Intel, argued that importing solid waste would generate revenue and jobs (Bell & Burke,
2005). The idea to import waste from other states happened discreetly with minimal
knowledge given to the public (Bell & Burke, 2005).
One answer to generating new jobs was buy offering up land for refuse from other
states. Bringing in landfill material from other states would bring revenue and jobs that
would stimulate the economy (Bell & Burke, 2005). The producer responsibility law could
represent a second answer to relieve the financial burdens of the government, generate jobs
for consumers, while pleasing environmental lobbyists. The producer responsibility law
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would require the manufacturers to pay for their own products rather than burdening the local
and state governments (Lindhqvist, 2000).
However, household disposal of e-waste nationwide was permitted (and in some
states, is still permitted), allowing e-waste to accumulate (RCRA). The consequence of
importing waste from other states was receiving all the e-waste, as most states do not have a
landfill ban on that waste. While waste was intended to generate revenue from tipping fees
per ton28, the State now was responsible for expense of the tons of e-waste that could not be
landfilled (Bell & Burke, 2005).
In further benefit, some manufacturers, for example, Hewlett Packard and Dell
supported the bill because it included responsibility for all stakeholders for product
management (“Bangor Daily News”, 2004). Manufacturers generally tend to gravitate
towards individual collection and recycling responsibility because this reduces costs and
prevalence free-riders, as mentioned previously in chapter three.

4.34 The details of Maine law and program
Governor John Baldacci signed the law on April 22, 2004. The initial bill, called “the Act to
Protect Public Health and the Environment by Providing for a system of Shared
Responsibility for the Safe Collection and Recycling of Electronic Waste”, was introduced
by the House on March 2, 2004, and sponsored by the Democratic Representative Ted
Koffman with very little opposition from other members (Maine State Legislature, 2004).

28

Tipping fees are a fee tacked onto waste to cover processing and disposal. These fees are
usually paid by the consumer or the municipality upon drop off at the landfill.
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Figure 7. Significant dates in the formation of Maine’s present law.
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Source: Electronics TakeBack Coalition, 2016; 38 M.R.S.A. §1610
This law initially only covered televisions, monitors, and laptops coming from
households (ETBC, 2016). The collection program started two years later in 2006. After
successfully collecting and recycling more than 14 million pounds of CEPs in three years, the
State decided to cover more products under the program in 2009 (Maine DEP, 2016).
Despite adding more products under the program, the collection rate went from 7,
912, 292 pounds to 5, 368, 467 pounds in 2010 (Maine DEP, 2016). This may have led to the
State broadening the scope of entities in 2011 from households to four other entities like
small businesses and non-profits, as listed in Table 2.
There has been a decrease is products recovered and recycled over time and this could
be due to less refuse or there could be leakage within the life cycle of e-waste recovery. The
following section outlines covered products along with the key stakeholder in Maine to
follow the products through the life cycle.

Products Covered and Stakeholder Responsibilities
The stewardship program under Maine’s law moves away from a linear disposal system
towards a cyclical recycling management system (as shown in figure 6). The program covers
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a wide range of products from various entities as shown in Table 2. The Maine Department
of Environmental Protection, hereafter referred to as the Department, is the enforcing entity.

Table 7. CEPs and entities covered under the program.
Televisions, portable DVD players, game consoles, computer
Products Covered

monitors, laptops, tablet e-readers, desktop printers, digital picture
frames

Entities Covered
Landfill Bans

Household, elementary schools, secondary schools, small businesses
of 100 employees or less, non-profits
CRTs and mercury containing products

Source: 38 M.R.S.A. §1610
There are three main stakeholders: manufacturers, consumers, and municipalities. Their
responsibilities are outlined in Table 3. Manufacturers must register their brands that are sold
within, report all past and present brands sold in the state, and label all outgoing products.

Table 8. Primary stakeholders in Maine and their responsibilities.
Stakeholder

Responsibility

Manufacturer

Funds recycling of all products

Municipality
Consumer

Funds transportation for collection
Establishes collection sites in every municipality
Takes CEPS to nearest collection sites
Pays occasional collection fee

Source: 38 M.R.S.A. §1610
These stakeholders ensure provide funding for Maine’s e-waste program. Other stakeholders
are also crucial to the success of the e-waste program: retailers, state government,
consolidators, and recycling and dismantling facilities. Their role in implementing the ewaste program are shown in Table 4.
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Table 9. Secondary stakeholders in Maine and their responsibilities.
Stakeholder

Responsibility

Retailers

Can only sell from registered and complying manufacturers
Enforces manufacturer participation
Monitors manufacturer and stakeholder compliance

State Government

Manages registration fees and covers costs for manufacturers that fail to
pay
Allocates the manufacturer’s annual share of orphan waste
Must identify the manufacturer of each CEP

Consolidators
Monitor monthly log of incoming CEPs
Recycling/Dismantling
Environmentally sound disassembly and recycling of CEPs
Facilities

Source: 38 M.R.S.A. §1610
There were other options the State of Maine could have sought for offsetting the cost of
collection and recycling of e-waste, such as advanced recovery fees or property taxes. Given
that consumers already paid a state tax of 5%, pay initial fees for products like tires, and paid
tipping fees for solid waste management, the State feared any additional fees for e-waste
would burden consumers. Additionally, ARF could have driven electronics consumers
towards cheaper options in the neighboring state or online (Wagner, 2009).

4.4 Comparison
In comparison with Washington, although Maine’s program precedes Washington's by two
years, it has collected and recycled substantially less CEPs (Washington reached 300 million
pounds as of 2016). This phenomenon could be explained by the difference in populations of
both states – Washington is almost 5 times larger than Maine – which correlates directly to
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the difference in recycling rates being almost 5 times higher in Washington than Maine (US
Census Bureau, 2014
The implementation process in Washington is robust, relatively speaking, in
comparison to other US e-waste policies (Nash & Bosso, 2013). In comparison to Maine,
Washington is equally if not more efficient in e-waste recycling. In 2003, only 20% of ewaste was recycled, but as a 2013 that percentage rose to 53%. Maine has a state led program
that is similar to Washington in that it requires all stakeholders to participate, however Maine
also allows more flexibility in including voluntary programs into its legislation, where
Washington does not.
Conclusions of both states offer lessons learned for other existing or upcoming states
to work together in formatting a policy with a framework that neighboring states mutually
enforce, collaborate with the electronics industry to maintain funding and reduce resistance,
and focus lobbying efforts on industry practices rather than just recycling more e-waste to
influence a more ‘green’ design rather than new law.
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Ch. 5 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

Conclusions
The world thrives on technology. This technology, once obsolete, presents risks to the
environment and to human health. These risks need to be swiftly minimized and controlled
through education and regulation. The public perception in the US is that this end-of-life
technology, e-waste, is adequately handled by the present solid waste management policies in
place. The reality is that e-waste is burdensome for most states to handle because the existing
facilities are not large enough to handle such a volume. Governments, businesses, citizens,
must understand the risks, costs, and advantages associated with implementing e-waste
regulations.
Some controls, such as EPR, show potential. Since the early 2000’s, over 23 states
and D.C. have implemented EPR take-back legislation and other states are beginning to
follow the trend. These programs are costly, where the financial burden falls onto the
manufacturer for funding collection, disposal, outreach and education (Reinan, 2006; Sachs,
2015).
The barriers to the patchwork of state initiatives are that they can become blurred and
a logistic inconvenience as most e-waste manufacturers are multi-national. Each state
requires an individual set of regulations that the manufacturers must follow. Secondly,
transboundary flows of e-waste are difficult to monitor and evaluate (Zotos, Karagiannidis,
Zampetoglou, Malamakis, & Tchobanaglous, 2009). Each state collects a different number of
products under programs that began at a different time. For data collection, this means that
there are significant gaps in data, which make it difficult to determine trends. As most
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programs are still young, not enough time has passed to yield one time-period of study (i.e.
15-20 years). Third, each state categorizes e-waste differently. For some states, e-waste
constitutes everything, including the keyboard or peripheral cords. Other states only consider
the monitor. This also makes comparing states difficult.
Other conclusions are that public-led systems achieve higher targets, but programs are
plateauing in the amounts of e-waste collected and recycled. They achieve higher targets
because there is a fine associated with meeting the target. It is unclear why the programs are
plateauing. In the initial years of Maine and Washington, for example, the programs recycled
millions of pounds of electronics, but as the program continues, that rate has slowed. This
may because e-waste is getting lighter, there may be leakage of e-waste elsewhere, or in that
state e-waste is diminishing.
Benefits from private-led systems (manufacturer-led systems) are that they are good
at engaging stakeholders, like producers and retailers (Young, 2007). Manufacturer-led
systems give the manufacturers the freedom to establish their own targets, boundaries,
programs, and money flows. Some recent evidence shows that many, like Best Buy, are
retreating from the take-back programs in the face of high costs (Best Buy, 2016). On the
contrary, Apple is an on-going example of how private system can work, especially in a
closed-loop take-back system. They have improved their product design by minimizing
hazardous components and planning a method for disassembly. Apple also encourages
consumers to return obsolete products for the chance of a refund. Private actors typically
engage in voluntary systems to 1) avoid public regulation because of high costs and stringent
standards, 2) increase positive marketing and to follow the green movement in drawing
consumer buy-in for a ‘greener’ product, 3) increase foot traffic in stores, for example, Best
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Buy or Radio Shack provides containers for consumers to drop off electronics, and likely
consumers will go inside to buy more.
Starting a program is easier if they 1) are green states and have a history of
environmental activism; 2) have effective state level lobbying by non-profits and the public;
3) overcome opposition from the electronics industry by providing an incentive for profit, as
seen in the Maine case or allow the electronics industry to determine their own contribution
and recycling levels, as seen in Washington State; 4) have supportive cross-boundary
relationships by neighboring states or nations, such as Washington, Oregon, and Canada
(Serrona, Yu, Aguinaldo, & Florece, 2014).

Policy Recommendations
This thesis suggests a framework for a unified supply chain scheme, where all actors are
responsible for a part, as designated by prescribed legislation. Also, this thesis suggests a
federal law. E-waste EPR programs would be most sustainable, while maintaining high
collection rates and continually diverting e-waste from incinerators, the landfill, or illegal
export. A long-term goal for e-waste management should be one uniform standard or federal
policy. The CEO of the Consumer Electronics Association (CEA) states that moving towards
a national solution would best replace, “…the complicated patchwork of rules that varies
from state to state…” (CEA, 2014). Although that more than half of the states in the US have
enacted a state law, most states include a federal preemption section that specifies that the
law is void if an equivalent federal law is establish. The Governor of Washington, for
example, outlined this before she signed the bill (70.95N.340). Federal legislation would be
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optimal because it solves the transboundary leakage issue, reduces complexity for
consumers, policy makers, and business.
The report from the Technology Administration (2006) indicates that one law, albeit
nationwide, already presents a set of challenges, let alone a variety of laws from multiple
states (Technology Administration, 2006). The report concluded that a nationwide system via
state legislation may best fit the needs of the US. An article from Manufacturing &
Technology News explains that the patchwork national system that is currently gaining
momentum could negatively impact the technology sectors ability to innovate and compete
because much of their funding would be lost through endless compliance regulations (2006).
This may not be true given this news article is almost over a decade old and the technology
sector has seemingly been uninhibited although the prevalence of EPR policies have grown.
This may shed light on one reason that EPR instruments have reached a limit in terms of
recycling rates and ultimate efficiency. After a few years, programs have seemed to plateau
in recovery rates and this could be attributed to a patchwork style of legislation where there
are too many rules to abide by. Most state EPR laws include a federal preemption section that
specifies that the law is void if an equivalent federal law is established (70.95N.340). This
shows that states made adequate preparations for the eventual federal law. Neither state-led
initiatives nor the industry-led initiatives have resulted in federal policy even though that is
seemingly the goal for all stakeholders (CEA, 2016).
In the absence of federal policy, policy recommendations for states with existing EPR
laws or for states seeking EPR laws there are a few recommendations. First, establish
efficient and cohesive data gathering at the state level. Gathering adequate data of existing ewaste, collected e-waste, types, weight, and quantity will help researchers frame the issue.
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The generated information can be used to create a sense of urgency within the state and
helping the public understand the extent of the problem.
Second, develop an effective lobbying campaign, especially if the state does not have
a past of environmental conscientiousness. Adapting the lobbying campaign to the needs and
interests of the state will encourage business buy-in and generate public awareness.
Third, create a policy that fits or reflects the policies of neighboring states. In lieu of
federal legislation, or blanket law as seen in the EU, similar policies will help with
transboundary enforcement and monitoring of e-waste. Lobbying efforts could also
communicate that e-waste has the potential to make money. Scholars researched that e-waste
has the potential to generate revenue, raise employment, and minimize use of raw and rare
materials, like indium. The Institute for Scrap Recycling Industries (ISRI) reported 19,000
new jobs in end-of-life management with the electronics industry bringing in $1.5 billion in
the US (2006). This thesis argues that EPR shows promise in the US given that enacted laws
cater to all actors throughout the lifecycle, i.e. producers, consumers, processors, retailers and
the state government.
Fourth, build an automatic tightening or adjustment into existing legislation for ewaste. E-waste domain is evolving rapidly and policies should be created to reflect that
evolution. For instance, as e-waste becomes lighter, weight will no longer serve as a clear
metric for “pounds of waste recycled”. A suggestion could be to require manufacturers to
recycle a percentage of what they sold in that fiscal year, and as every year passes, that
percentage increases.
Fifth, refocus lobbying and non-profit efforts on the reputations of companies instead
of trying to pass a public-led mandatory law. Redirecting energy of advocates from a law to
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manufacturer reputations could result in holding manufacturers accountable for an
insufficient, albeit cheap, route of disposal. Manufacturers will not jeopardize profit for bad
publicity.
Lastly, encourage closed loop product take-back initiatives. Shifting the cradle-tograve system to a reduce, reuse, recycle system will aid in diverting waste from landfills by
not creating waste in the first place. Additionally, third party logistics are unclear and vague.
Many third-party recyclers or landfills allow illegal wastes into the landfill simply due to
negligence. A part of the closed-loop process is monitoring all stakeholders through
sufficiently.

82

Bibliography
Alev, I., Agrawal, V., & Atasu, A. (2016). Extended Producer Responsibility and Secondary
Markets: Working Paper Series No. 2015-25. Georgetown Mcdonough School of
Business Research Paper.
Annenberg Learner. (2014). Solid Waste. Garbage: how can my community reduce waste.
Retrieved October 2, 2015, from
http://www.learner.org/interactives/garbage/solidwaste.html
Association for Home Electric Appliances. (2013). Home Appliance Recycling 2013 Annual
Report. Japan: Author.
Apple. (2016). Apple_Environmental_Responsibility_Report_2016: Progress Report.
Atasu, A., Özdemir, Ö., & van Wassenhove, L. N. (2013). Stakeholder Perspectives on EWaste Take-Back Legislation. Production and Operations Management, 22(2), 382–
396. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01364.x
Atasu, A., & Subramanian, R. (2011). Extended Producer Responsibility for E WasteIndividual or Collective Producer Responsibility. Production and Operations
Management, 21(6), 1041-1059.
Atasu, A., & van Wassenhove, L. (2011). Getting to Grips With Take-Back Laws: What’s
Yours Is Mine. IESE Insight. (8), 29–35. https://doi.org/10.15581/002.ART-1892
Atasu, A., van Wassenhove, L. N., & Sarvary, M. (2009). Efficient Take-Back Legislation.
Productions and Operations Management, 18(3), 243–258. Retrieved from
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.niagara.edu/docview/228751741?accountid=2821
3 Atlee, J. & Kirchain, R. (2006). Operational sustainability metrics assessing
effectiveness in the context of electronics-recycling systems. Environmental Science
& Technology, 40(14), 4506–4513.
Baldé, C.P., Wang, F., Kuehr, R., Huisman, J. (2015). The global e-waste monitor – 2014.
Bonn, Germany: United Nations University.
BAN. (2002). E-waste. In Exporting Harm: The high-tech trashing of Asia. Retrieved
October 3, 2015, from http://svtc.org/wp-content/uploads/technotrash.pdf
Bangor Daily News. (2004). E-waste solutions. Retrieved on March 13, 2016 from
http://archive.bangordailynews.com/2004/04/01/e-waste-solutions/
Basel Convention & UNEP. (2011). Basel convention: overview.
http://www.basel.int/theconvention/overview/tabid/1271/default.aspx
Bell & Burke. (2005). Waste management in Maine: the west old town landfill (Master’s
thesis, University of Maine, 2005). University of Maine Orono, School of Economics
Faculty Scholarship.
Beveridge and Diamond. (2013). Recycling company fined 4.5 million for illegal export of
electronic waste; executives receive prison sentences. In News & Events. Retrieved
January 2, 2017, from http://www.bdlaw.com/news-1508.html
Bouvier, R., & Wagner, T. (2011). The influence of collection facility attributes on
household collection rates of electronic waste: The case of televisions and computer
monitors. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 55(11), 1051–1059.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2011.05.019

83
Bushehri, F. (2010). UNEP’s role in promoting environmentally sound management of ewaste. Personal Collection of Fareed Bushehri, UNEP, Regional Office of West Asia.
Clement, K. (1998). Extended Producer Responsibility: Conditions for a successful policy.
Some experiences in the Netherlands. In OECD Workshop on Extended and Shared
Responsibility for Products, 1-3 December 1998, Washington, D.C., p. 3.
Closed Loop Fund. (2016). E-waste study. In Current CL foundation initiatives. Retrieved
December 14, 2016, from http://www.closedloopfund.com/foundation/
Coalition wants more out of Apple's new 'e-waste' recycling program. Hazardous Waste
Superfund Alert, 5(116), Retrieved on March 13, 2016, from http://go.galegroup.com
/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA139429039&v=2.1&u=nysl_we_niagarau&it=r&p=AONE&
sw=w&asid=d643237e260e42e3ace2169f838d5f52
Consumer Electronics Association. (2013). Third annual report of the ecycling leadership
initiative. Arlington: Author.
Council of State Governments. (2016). Energy & environment. Retrieved October 13, 2016,
from http://www.csg.org/energy_environment.aspx
CTA. (2015). Reducing production waste. In 2015 Sustainability report. Retrieved March 14,
2016, from http://www.corporatereport.com/cta/2015/sr/operations/introduction.php
Department of Revenue Washington State. (2015). Revenue at a Glance: Working together to
fund Washington’s future, from
http://dor.wa.gov/docs/pubs/misc/revenueataglance.pdf.
Dinnage, R. J. (2005). Washington state lawmakers told to ban PBDEs. Pesticide & Toxic
Chemical News 32(19). Retrieved March 13, 2006 from http://bi.galegroup.com.
ezproxy.niagara.edu/essentials/article/GALE%7CA140709491?u=nysl_we_niagarau
Dinnage, R. J. (2006). States move to preserve TRI, maintain electronic waste
recycling. Pesticide & Toxic Chemical News 34(23). Retrieved March 13, 2006 from
http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.niagara.edu/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=nysl_we_niagarau
&id=GALE|A144155280&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon&userGroup=nysl_we_niagarau
&authCount=1
DOE. (2007). Issue 07-15-037 amendment to chapter 173-303. Washington State:
Washington State Register. http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/laws/wsr/2007/15/0715PROP.pdf
Doms, M. (2004). The boom and bust in information technology investment*. Economic
Review - Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 19-34. Retrieved from
http://ezproxy.niagara.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.niagara.edu/
docview/208779421?accountid=28213EPA. (2011). Characterization of Municipal
Solid Waste by Weight. Retrieved from
http://www3.epa.gov/epawaste/nonhaz/municipal/pubs/MSWcharacterization_fnl_06
0713_2_rpt.pdf.
Duan, H., Miller, R., Gregory, J., & Kirchain, R. (2013). Quantitative Characterization of
Domestic and Transboundary Flows of Used Electronics: Analysis of Generation,
Collection, and Export in the US.EPA. (2005). P3 Design of a National Electronics
Product Reuse and Recycling System. Retrieved from

84
http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncer_abstracts/index.cfm/fuseaction/display.
highlight/abstract/7347.
Electronics Recycling Coordination Clearinghouse. (2016). Map of states with legislation.
Vienna: Author.
Electronics TakeBack Coalition. (2013). Brief comparison of state e-waste laws. In Toolkit
for state legislative advocates. Retrieved March 20, 2016, from
http://www.electronicstakeback.com/promote-good-laws/state-legislation-toolkit/
Engel, H., Stuchtey, M., & Vanthournout, H. (2016, February). Managing waste in emerging
markets. Retrieved March 30, 2016, from http://www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/sustainability-and-resource-productivity/our-insights/managing-waste-inemerging-markets?cid=other-eml-alt-mip-mck-oth-1602
EPA. (2011). Electronics waste management in the United States through 2009. Washington,
D.C.: Author.
EPA. (2013). Municipal solid waste in the United States. Washington, DC: United States
Environmental Protection Agency.
EPA. (2014). Municipal solid waste generation, recycling, and disposal in the United States.
Washington, DC: United States Environmental Protection Agency.
EPA. (2015). Electronics Donation and Recycling. Retrieved from
http://www.epa.gov/recycle/electronics-donation-and-recycling.
EPA. (2017). National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship (NSES). In Cleaning up
electronic waste (e-waste). Retrieved December 13, 2016 from
https://www.epa.gov/smm-electronics/national-strategy-electronics-stewardship-nses
ETCSCP. (2010). European Topic Centre on Sustainable Consumption and Production part
of the European Environment Information Observation Network.
European Environment Agency. (2010). Common environmental theme from Hungary. In
Waste – National Responses. Retrieved on April 6, 2016, from
https://www.eea.europa.eu/soer/countries/hu/waste-national-responses-hungary
European Union. (2016). History of the European Union. In About the EU. Retrieved on
April 2, 2016, from https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en#1970-1979
E-waste regulations advance in states; most plans lack funding mechanisms. Solid Waste
Report, 37(8), Retrieved on March 13, 2016 from http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id
=GALE%7CA144718680&v=2.1&u=nysl_we_niagarau&it=r&p=ITOF&sw=w&asi
d=c391eb869ed9da9f3a28a36fe05034d5GAO. (U.S. Government Accountability
Office). 2010. Electronic waste: Considerations for promoting environmentally sound
reuse and recycling. GAO-10-626. Washington, DC, USA: GAO.
GreenBiz Editors. (2004, February). Industry reaches agreement on national e-waste
recycling program. Retrieved March 14, 2016, from https://www.greenbiz.com/
news/2004/02/16/industry-reaches-agreement-national-e-waste-recycling-program
Gregoire, C. (2006). Veto message on ESSB 6428. Washington State Legislature: Access
Washington.
Gui, L., Atasu, A., Ozlem, E., & Toktay, L. B. (2013). Implementing producer stakeholder
responsibility legislation: a multi-stakeholder case analysis. Journal of Industrial
Ecology, 00(0), 1-15.

85
Herat, S. & Agamuthu, P. (2012). E-waste: a problem or an opportunity? Review of issues,
challenges and solutions in Asian countries. Waste Management & Research 30(11),
1113-1125.
HP. (2015). 2015 Sustainability report. Headquarters: HP Development Company.
http://h20195.www2.hp.com/V2/GetDocument.aspx?docname=c05154920
Hsiao, P., Reinhard, R., & Linden, S. (2007). State-led initiatives on electronic recycling and
waste control. Trends, 39(2). Retrieved March 13, 2016, from
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA206535171&v=2.1&u=nysl_we_nia
garau&it=r&p=STND&sw=w&asid=666e45e88e27fb314fbb47c9ddb9c611
Khetriwal, D. S., Kraeuchi, P., and Widmer, R. "Producer Responsibility for E-waste
Management: Key Issues for Consideration – Learning from the Swiss
Experience." Journal of Environmental Management, 90(1) (2009): 153-65.
Krikke, H., Bloemhof-Ruwaard, J., & Van Wassenhove, L. (2003). Concurrent product and
closed-loop supply chain design with an application to refrigerators. Int J Prod Res,
41(16), 3689–3719
Kunz, N., Atasu, A., Mayers, K., & Van Wassenhove, L. (2014). Extended producer
responsibility: stakeholder concerns and future developments. France: INSEAD
Social Innovation Centre.
League of Conservation Voters. (2006). National environmental scorecard. Washington,
D.C.: Author.
League of Conservation Voters. (2008). National environmental scorecard. Washington,
D.C.: Author.
League of Conservation Voters. (2009). National environmental scorecard. Washington,
D.C.: Author.
League of Conservation Voters. (2010). National environmental scorecard. Washington,
D.C.: Author.
League of Conservation Voters. (2011). National environmental scorecard. Washington,
D.C.: Author.
League of Conservation Voters. (2012). National environmental scorecard. Washington,
D.C.: Author.
Lee, H. & Shao, M. (2009). Promoting competition in e-waste recycling. In European
Recycling Platform. Retrieved on June 10, 2016, from https://www.gsb.
stanford.edu/faculty-research/case-studies/european-recycling-platform-promotingcompetition-e-waste-recycling
Lepawsky, J. (2012). Legal geographies of e-waste legislation in Canada and the US:
Jurisdication, responsibility and the taboo of production. Geoforum, 43(6), 11941206.
Li, X., Y. Li, and K. Govindan. "An Incentive Model for Closed-loop Supply Chain under
the EPR Law." The Journal of the Operational Research Society 65.1 (2014;2013;):
88. Web. 13 Feb. 2016.
Lifset, R. (1993). Take it back: extended producer responsibility as a form of incentive-based
environmental policy. Journal of Resource Management and Technology, 21(4), 164175.

86
Lindhqvist, T. (2000). Extended producer responsibility in cleaner production (Doctoral
Dissertation, Lund University, 2000). IIIEE, 60-65.
Lindhqvist, T. (2015). Proceedings of IIIEE20 Anniversary Conference: Division of
responsibility between producers and municipalities. Sweden: Lund University.
Lindhqvist, T. & Lifset, R. (2008). Producer responsibility at a turning point? Journal of
Industrial Ecology, 12(2), 144-147.
Lindhqvist, T., Manomaivibool, P., Tojo, N. Lund University. (2007). Extended Producer
Responsibility in a Non-OECD Context: The management of waste and electronic
equipment in India. Sweden: IIIEE at Lund University.
Linnell, J. (2006). "E-waste regulations advance in states; most plans lack funding
mechanisms." Solid Waste Report 14 Apr. 2006: 72. General OneFile. Web. 21 Apr.
2016. http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA144718680&v=2.1&u=nys
l_we_niagarau&it=r&p=ITOF&sw=w&asid=c391eb869ed9da9f3a28a36fe05034d5
Manomaivibool, P., Lindhqvist, T., Tojo, N. (2008). EPR in a non-oecd context: an
introduction to research projects on the management of WEEE. Lund, Sweden: Lund
University.
Massarutto, Antonio. (2014). The Long and Winding Road to Resource Efficiency – An
Interdisciplinary Perspective on Extended Producer Responsibility. Resources,
Conservation and Recycling, 85, 11-21.
McAllister, L. (2013). Hiding in plain sight: the role of multinational electronics
corporations in environmental and human harm (Master’s thesis, University of
Colorado, 2013).
Manufacturing Technology and News. More players seek national system for electronics
recycling, ,13(16), Retrieved on March 13, 2016 from
http://bi.galegroup.com.ezproxy
.niagara.edu/essentials/article/GALE%7CA151441602?u=nysl_we_niagarau
Maine DEP. (2016). Electronics recycling. Retrieved October 20, 2016, from
https://www1.maine.gov/dep/waste/ewaste/index.html
Microsoft. (2016). Greening our product lifecycle. In Values. Retrieved November 16, 2016,
from https://www.microsoft.com/about/csr/environment/solutions/cloud/
Murphy, D. (2016, July 28). Unum's income rises 5.6% over same quarter in 2015. Portland
Press Herald.
Nash, J. & Bosso, C. (2013). Extended Producer Responsibility in the United States: Full
Speed Ahead? In Journal of Industrial Ecology, 17(2): 175-185.
Netstate. (2016). The state of Maine. Retrieved October 13, 2016, from
http://netstate.com/states/intro/me_intro.htm
Nicolescu, M., & Jula, M. (Eds.). (2016). Analysis of Household Behaviour to the collection
of Waste electrical and electronic equipment in romania. Global Economic Observer,
3(2), 19-26.
OECD. (1998). Extended producer responsibility. Phase 2. Case study on the German
Packaging Ordinance. Paris: OECD (ENV/EPOC/PPC(97)21/REV2), p. 18.

87
OECD. (2001). Extended producer responsibility: a guidance manual for governments. Paris
Cedex 16: OECD Press.
Oklahoma DEQ. (2016). Garbage: the black sheep of the family. In Waste history. Retrieved
May 2, 2016, from http://www.deq.state.ok.us/lpdnew/wastehistory/wastehistory.htm
Pennsylvania DEP. (2016). Disposition of IT equipment and electronic waste products
procedure. Erie: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
PSI. (2016). Map of state EPR laws. Retrieved January 30, 2016, from
https://productstewardship.site-ym.com/?State_EPR_Laws_Map
Quoden, J. (2016). Extended producer responsibility at a glance. Brussels: Extended
Producer Responsibility Alliance.
Rabe, B. G. (2007). Beyond Kyoto: Climate Change Policy in Multilevel Governance
Systems. Governance, 20(3), 423–444. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14680491.2007.00365.x
Rabe, B. G. (2008a). States on steroids: the intergovernmental odyssey of American climate
policy. The Review of Policy Research, 25(2), 105+. Retrieved from
http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.niagara.edu/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=nysl_we_ni
agarau&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA176820861&sid=summon&asid=54bb95c65bf
f07392fc0faf5d3f4e843
Rabe, B.G. (2008b). The absence of governance: climate change in Canada and the United
States. Canadian-American Public Policy, 73(1), 1-34.
Rabe, B. G. (2013). Not here, not there, not anywhere: politics, social movements, and the
disposal of low-level radioactive waste. london. The Review of Policy Research,
30(1), 136+. Retrieved from
http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.niagara.edu/ps/i.do?p=ITOF&sw=w&u=nysl_we_ni
agarau&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA320266631&sid=summon&asid=bc04471e750
bb4c49725056b6bfc84de"
Reinan, J. (2006). A never-ending debate: How best to trash electronics; Computer
manufacturers are fighting a bill to set up a state electronics recycling program. They
want to handle it themselves. Star Tribune 6(1). Retrieved March 13, 2016, from
http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.niagara.edu/ps/retrieve.do?sort=RELEVANCE&doc
Type=Article&tabID=T004&prodId=ITOF&searchId=R1&resultListType=RESULT
_LIST&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&contentSegment=&currentPosition=1&s
earchResultsType=SingleTab&inPS=true&userGroupName=nysl_we_niagarau&docI
d=GALE%7CA146090985&contentSet=GALE%7CA146090985
Sachs, N. (2015). Planning the funeral at the birth: extended producer responsibility in the
European union and the united states. Richmond: Richmond School of Law.
Saphores, J.-D. M., Nixon, H., Ogunseitan, O., & Shapiro, A. (2006). Household Willingness
to Recycle Electronic Waste: An Application to California. Environment and
Behavior, 38(2), 183–208. https://doi.org/10.1177/0013916505279045
Schwarzer, S., Bono, A., Peduzzi, P., Giuliana, G., & Kluser, S. (2005). E-waste, the hidden
side of IT equipment’s manufacturing and use. UNEP Warning on Emerging
Environmental Threats No. 5 Switzerland: United Nations Environment Program.

88
Selin, H., & VanDeveer, S. D. (Eds.). (2009). American and comparative environmental
policy. Changing climates in North American politics: Institutions, policymaking, and
multilevel governance. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Retrieved from
http://lib.myilibrary.com/detail.asp?id=269475
Sepúlveda, A., Schluep, M., Renaud, F. G., Streicher, M., Kuehr, R., Hagelüken, C.,
Gerecke, A. C. (2010). A review of the environmental fate and effects of hazardous
substances released from electrical and electronic equipments during recycling.
Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 30(1), 28-41.
Serrona, K., Yu, J., Aguinaldo, E., & Florece, L. (2014). Developing a monitoring and
evaluation framework to integrate and formalize the informal waste and recycling
sector: The case of the Philippine National Framework Plan. Waste Management &
Research 32(9), 882-895.
Short, M., 2004. “Taking Back the Trash: Comparing European Extended Producer
Responsibility and Take-Back Liability to U.S. Environmental Policy and Attitudes."
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 37, 1217-1253.
Slade, G. (2012). Planned Obsolescence Creates Unnecessary E-Waste. In T. Thompson
(Ed.), At Issue. What Is the Impact of E-Waste? Detroit: Greenhaven Press.
(Reprinted from Made to Break: Technology and Obsolescence in America, pp. 1-7,
2006, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) Retrieved from
http://ic.galegroup.com.ezproxy.niagara.edu/
SVTC, 2004. “Poison PCs and Toxic TVs.” Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, San Jose, CA.
http://svtc.live2.radicaldesigns.org/resources/reports/ppc-ttv1/ (verified on 4-12011).
Tasaki, T., Tojo, N., & Lindhqvist, T. (2015). International survey on stakeholders'
perception of the concept of extended producer responsibility and product
stewardship. (Report of joint research of IIIEE and NIES). [Publisher information
missing].
Toyasaki, F., Boyacι, T., & Verter, V. (2011). An Analysis of Monopolistic and Competitive
Take-Back Schemes for WEEE Recycling. Production and Operations Management,
20(6), 805–823. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2010.01207.x
UNEP. (2016). The Convention. In Overview. Retrieved December 14, 2016, from
http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/Overview/History/Overview/
tabid/3405/Default.aspx
United Nations University. (2007). Review of directive 2002/96 on waste electrical and
electronic equipment (WEEE). Bonn: Author.
United Nations University. (2007). Review of directive 2002/96 on waste electrical and
electronic equipment (WEEE). Bonn: Author.
U.S. Census Bureau. (2015). Manufacturers’ shipments, inventories, & orders: definitions.
Retrieved March 11, 2016, from
http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/m3/definitions/index.html.
U. S. Census Bureau. (2015). QuickFacts for Maine, California, and Washington. Retrieved
March 11, 2016, from http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/23,06,53.
Valli, H. (2002). e-Junk Explosion. Environmental Health Perspectives, 110(4), 188–
194.Vann, K., Musson, S., & Townsend, T. (2006). Evaluation of modified TCLP

89
methodology for RCRA toxicity characterization of computer CPUs. Journal of
Harzardous Materials, 129(1-3), 101-109.
Veit, H.M., & Bernardes, A.M. (Eds.). (2015). Electronic Waste: Generation and
Management. In Electronic waste: Recycling techniques (pp. 3-9). Switzerland:
Springer International Publishing.
Wagner, T. P. (2009). Shared responsibility for managing electronic waste: a case study of
Maine, USA. Waste management (New York, N.Y.), 29(12), 3014–3021.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wasman.2009.06.015
Walls, M. (2006). Extended Producer Responsibility and Product Design: Econonomic
Theory and Selected Case Studies: Discussion Paper.
Waste 360. (2016). Why best buy’s monitor recycling fee could be the death of knell for free
e-waste programs. In E-waste recycling. Retrieved on April 20, 2016, from
http://www.waste360.com/e-waste/why-best-buy-s-monitor-recycling-fee-could-bedeath-knell-free-e-waste-programs
Washington DOE. (2010). ECycle Washington. In welcome to ecycle Washington. Retrieved
June 12, 2016, from http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/swfa/eproductrecycle/
Washington DOE. (2016). State solid and hazardous waste plan. Lacey: Washington DOE.
Washington Environmental Council. (2016). Recycling challenge. Washington Depot:
Author.
Washington Post. (2015). Policy gets personal: how technology and policy intersect to
provide better healthcare. Samsung. Retrieved on April 4, 2016, from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/brand-connect/samsung
Washington Toxics Coalition. (2015). Washington Toxics Coalition. In Protecting the
environment and health. Retrieved December, 2, 2016, from
http://nwtoxiccommunities.org/members/washington/washington-toxics-coalition
Western Product Stewardship Collaborative. (2012). Overview of stewardship and extended
producer responsibility job and economic impacts study. Ontario: Duncan Bury
Consulting.
Williams, E., Kahhat, R., Allenby, B., Kavazanjian, E., Kim, J., & Xu, M. (2008).
Environmental, social, and economic implications of global reuse and recycling of
personal computers. Environmental Science & Technology 42(11), 6446-6454.
Yano, J., & Sakai, S. (2016). Waste prevention indicators and their implications from a life
cycle perspective: A review. Journal of Material Cycles and Waste Management,
18(1), 38–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10163-015-0406-7
Young, S. (2007). Unit-based municipal solid waste management policies: Drivers and
barriers in massachusetts (Order No. 1442564). Available from ProQuest
Dissertations & Theses Global. (304804020). Retrieved from
http://ezproxy.niagara.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/304804020?
accountid=28213
Zhang, K., Schnoor, J., & Zeng, E. Y. (2012). E-waste recycling: where does it go from here?
Environmental Science & Technology, 46(1), 10861-10867.
Zoeteman, B. C. J., Krikke, H. R., & Venselaar, J. (2010). Handling WEEE waste flows: On
the effectiveness of producer responsibility in a globalizing world. The International

90
Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology, 47(5-8), 415–436.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00170-009-2358-3
Zotos, G., Karagiannidis, S., Zampetoglou, A., Malamakis, I., Antonopoulos, S.,
Kontogianni, and Tchobanoglous, G. (2009). Developing a Holistic Strategy for
Integrated Waste Management within Municipal Planning: Challenges, Policies,
Solutions and Perspectives for Hellenic Municipalities in the Zero-waste, Low-cost
Direction. Waste Management, 29(5), 1686-692.

91

Appendix A: Components of e-waste and their health implications
WEEE is comprised of rubber, plastic, and many precious metals. What some may not know
are the potential health and environmental risks that come with mishandling and improper
disposal of such substances. Table 1 lists some materials used in desktop computers. The
components are adopted from a list compiled by the Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC,
2004). Highlighted in the table are the most abundant materials that generate the utmost
concern to the environment and human health.

Source: Sepulveda, et al., 2010
Table 1. Itemized substances found within e-waste products.
Elements within e-waste
Health Risks
Endocrine disruptors,
Brominated Flame Retardants
inhibitors to development
(PBB & PBDE)
growth, digestive and
lymphatic cancer
Lead
Central and peripheral
nervous system damage,
kidney damage, endocrine
disruptor, inhibits brain
development in youth,
Cadmium
Kidney dysfunction, possible
skeletal damage, and
carcinogenetic

Environmental Risk
Concentrated levels can
transcend the food chain.
Point sources are waste
dumps and landfill leachate
Environmentally
accumulates, damages
plants and animals, can
contaminate drinking water
supplies
Environmentally persistent,
uptake by crops, like
potatoes and carrots, and
can become airborne if
burned
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Mercury (methyl mercury,
once exposed)

Chronic brain damage

Hexavalent Chromium

Allergic reactions, asthmatic
bronchitis, DNA mutagen,
carcinogenic
Accumulates in human body
fat, carcinogenic, and is a
hormone disruptor

Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC)
(type of plastic used in older
models of computers)

Accumulates in living
organisms and transcends
through the food chain
Seeps into landfill leachate,
and if burned, become
airborne
When burned, dioxin is
released. It is
environmentally persistent
with the potential to settle
on crops and in waterways.

Source: SVTC, 2004.
The implications for management and exposure to these metals is obvious for developing
countries that burn and otherwise improperly dispose of WEEE. What is less obvious is that
the risk of significant exposure is very much so a possibility in the US. The US maintains
inconsistent data about the flow of WEEE: some reaches the landfill as household waste,
some is incinerated, and some is still sent for illegal export. This is partially due to the
difficulty in categorizing and recycling the individual components of EEE.
Cathode ray tubes (CRTs) are used for older video displays for the years between
1997 and 2004 (SVTC, 2004). These components are considered hazardous waste under both
federal and state law because they contain high levels of lead and other heavy metals (about
4-8 lbs per television), as will be discussed later in the complications with e-waste
management (SVTC, 2004).
Initiatives are led nationwide to improve on the quality and design of EEE to include
less heavy metals and hazardous substances, which means easier re-use and recyclability for
future EoL products. However, the issue is with the existing and growing Everest of e-waste
as households and small businesses clear out their basements of unused equipment and know
of no other option to dispose of their products except for the landfill. Furthermore, as
enforcement on international and transboundary movements of e-waste becomes more
stringent, e-waste will persist in the environment until it is properly managed.
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Appendix B: Categories of EPR Models
Dual Model
The Dual Model holds the industry or the producer solely responsible for costs and proper
disposal of the products throughout the lifecycle (Lindhqvist, 2015, p. 5). This model exists
in Austria, Germany, and Sweden. Germans hold a seminal example of the Dual Model with
the “German Green Dot” scheme implemented back in 1991 to manage waste packaging
(Fleckinger & Glachant, 2009, p. 2). This is one of several dual systems to mandate
manufactures and distributors to take back empty packaging from consumers free of charge.
The green dot on packages to communicate to consumers that it could be recycled (Baughan
& Evale, 2004, p. 7). The manufacturer here is then responsible for recycling the returned
waste.
As a result, many companies began using less packaging. This scheme has since extended
towards e-waste, according to the German-British Chamber of Industry and Commerce (n.d.,
p. 2). This schematic is very successful for companies that have an identifiable logo,
especially when it comes to electronics (Lindquist, 2000, p. 63; Fleckinger & Glachant, 2009,
p. 5). In the United States the take-back legislation is intended to incentivize manufacturers
to design for product recovery (DfR) (Atasu & Subramanian, 2011). This means using less
hazardous materials in construction, reusing old components, and by recycling all materials
for EoL products. In cases where the distributor is traceable, Producer Responsibility
Organizations (PRO) are key stakeholders, as coined in the EU (Deloitte, 2014). PROs set up
industry-wide schemes to reinforce EPR approaches (OECD, 2001). The manufacturers can
choose to form a coalition with other like-organizations to gather similar products, which can
reduce costs for the individual manufacturer and can encourage large-scale infrastructure for
recycling (Fleckinger & Glachant, 2009, p. 3). Although PROs are either voluntary or
legislative movements, only voluntary coalitions exist in the US.
Industry-municipality model
In countries where the communities are not satisfied with the manufacturer output, the
industry-municipality model was born. This model outlines an arrangement between the
producer and the local municipalities for cooperative e-waste management and collection
(Lindhqvist, 2015, p. 5). This model alleviates pressure from the manufactures and provides
a framework to manage solid waste in parcels. The municipalities manage sorting and
collection, while the manufacturer provide funding. In theory, this should provide a more
efficient and convenient service for the people. An unspoken nuance, but no less important,
is that the model would not be successful without the support of the government (Lindhqvist,
2015, p. 5).
Countries like Belgium, Spain, France, and the Czech Republic applied the industrymunicipality model to solid waste management to address the issues with the dual model. For
instance, the model in Belgium reflects the industry-municipality model with one uniform
program for collection with local or municipal level adaptations (Adams, 2015, p. 3). Very
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like the German Dot Program, the Belgians first focused on take-back initiatives for
packaging products. The difference being more commitment for the local authorities. Private
waste collectors gather all industrial and commercial waste, door to door collection for
household waste, and incentivizing consumer independence with composting (Adams, 2015,
p. 16). The EPR scheme is coupled with a policy instrument like recycling targets or
landfilling bans passed a certain tonnage (Adams, 2015, p. 10). This model has proven
successful in countries that have a reliable reinforcement from the law and strict government
sanctions. Many examples of this in the US are at the state level in Wisconsin or Minnesota
that have implemented strict recycling targets for producers to collect e-waste (Nash &
Bosso, 2013). This resulted in about a 4-lb. per capita recycling rate in just one year in
Minnesota (Nash & Bosso, 2013). This model is regionally appropriate given economic
stability and a ‘level playing field’ (Adams, 2015, p. 28). In short, success of the model is
contingent upon natural fair competition.
Trade credits model
The tradable credits model is adopted mainly in the United Kingdom where the producers
buy ‘packaging recovery notes’ or evidence that the waste product was upcycled (Lindhqvist,
2015, 12). This schematic allows producers within the same industry to trade recyclable
commodities, so that an industry-wide target is met. This allows perhaps smaller firms within
an industry to perform less efficiently than another firm with more advanced infrastructure. It
does not matter who meets the goal, but it matters that the goal is met (Walls, 2006, p. 3).
This is a model like carbon standards, yet applied to solid waste management. Walls (2006)
states that the feasibility of this model is more cost-effective, but an industry-wide recycling
target might not drive producers to improve the ‘design for the environment’ (DfE) like
reducing material usage, downsizing a product, or make a product less hazardous if the
standards can still be met without a large change (p. 20). The trade credits model is yet to be
seen in the US.
Other variations between models
The three models outline the most prominent global distinctions between EPR models
(Lindhqvist, 2015, 12). Within the models themselves, there can be subtle inconsistencies
with the allocation of power, i.e. the ratio of responsibility between municipalities,
producers, and consumers. Another variation could be who regulates the PRO for an industry
or competition between several PROs may change the economic role (Lindhqvist, 2015, 11).
Competition between systems could increase efficiency and productivity or result it
monopolies. In some cases, this has proved to show a lack of control of the government over
the industry, thus leading to economic instability.
Theoretically, the flexibility of the EPR schematic is ideal because it is flexible and
adaptable to changing economic structures and political instruments. The debate is whether
EPR is functional on the ground for e-waste even after 20 years of development in OECD
countries.
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3

4

CA

CT

Hawaii

Illinois

Advance
Recycling Fee

2005

California Electronic Waste
Recycling Program

Yes, given to the state to pay
recyclers

Yes, for CRT, TV,
monitors,
computers, printers,
VCRs, CP,
telephones, radios,
and microwaves,
2006
Yes, computers,
laptops, computer
monitors, TVs,
printers, and
components

2006
-

California
Department of
Resources Recycling
and Recovery
(CalRecycle)
Department of Toxic
Substances Control

Sources

Enforcing
Department?

Effective Year
Ban?

Landfill Ban for
Electronics

For Electronics?

Recycling
Program

Collection
Start Date

State

#

Program Type
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-

SB50
SB20
Electronic
Waste
Recovery and
Recycling

Producer
Responsibility
Program –
take back

2010

State operated program

PRP

2010

Manufacturer operated Hawaii
electronic device and
television recycling law

Yes, Computers, Laptops,
Computer Monitors, Computer
Printers, Televisions

None

---

Hawaii Department of
Health

Hawaii Electronic
Waste and
Television Recycling
and Recovery Law

Manufacturer Operated
Program

yes, computers, laptops, computer
monitors, printers, televisions,
electronic keyboardsm fax
machines, VCRs, portable digital
musics players, DVD players,
video game consoles, small scale
servers, scanners, electronic mice,
digital converter boxes, cable
receivers, satellite receivers,
DVRs

Yes, computers,
laptops, computer
monitors,
televisions, and
printers

2012

Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency

Public Act 097-0287

Producer
Responsibility
Program

2010

Yes, Connecticut’s Electronics
Recycling Law

2009

-

CT DEEP

Connecticut's
Electronics
Recycling Law

2011

Indiana Department of
Environmental
Management

Maine*

Producer
Responsibility
Program –
take back

2006

State operated program –
Maine E-waste Manufacturer
Responsibility Program

Yes, laptops, computer monitors,
printers, televisions, digital photo
frames, DVD players

Yes, CRT
containing devices

2006

Maine Department of
Environmental Protection

Maryland

PRP – take
back

2006

Man. Operated, Maryland
Recycling Program

Yes, computers, comp monitors,
laptops, TVs

None

Michigan

Producer
Responsibility
Program –
take back

2010

Man. Operated, Michigan
Electronic Waste Takeback
Program

Yes, computers, comp monitors,
laptops, printers, televisions

None

Minnesota

Producer
Responsibility
Program –
take back

2007

Manufacturer Operated,
Minnesota Electronics
Recycling Program

Yes, comp monitors, laptops, TV,
comp, peripherals (printers,
keyboards, mice), fax machines,
DVD players, VCRs

Yes on CRT
computer monitors
and TV

7

Sources

Enforcing
Department?

Effective Year
Ban?

Landfill Ban for
Electronics
Yes, computers,
laptops, computer
monitors,
televisions, printers
and others

6

9

For Electronics?
Yes, computers monitors, laptops,
televisions

Indiana

8

Recycling
Program

2010

Manufacturer Operated
Program, Indiana E-waste
Program

Producer
Responsibility
Program –
take back

5

Collection
Start Date

Program Type

#

State
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Maryland Department of
the Environment

Maryland Statewide
Electronics Program

-

Michigan Department of
Natural Resources and
Environment

Michigan
Electronics Law

2006

Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency

Minnesota
Electronics
Recycling Act

10

Missouri

PRP

2010

Manufacturer operated, ecycle Missouri program

Yes, computers, laptops,
computer monitors

None

-

Missouri Department of
Natural Resources

11

New
Jersey

PRP – trade
credits

2011

Manufacturer operated
Program, E-cycle New Jersey
Program

Yes, computer, comp monitors,
laptops, televisions

Yes, comps, laptops,
comp monitors, TVs

2011

New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection

Sources

Enforcing
Department?

Effective Year Ban?

Landfill Ban for
Electronics

For Electronics?

Recycling Program

Year

State

#

Program Type
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-Missouri
Manufacturer
Responsibility and
consumer
Convenience
Equipment
Collection and
Recovery Act
-Electronic Scrap
Management Rule
Link to
Legislation:New
Jersey Electronic
Waste Management
Act
E-Waste
Management
Rules (proposed)

12

New York

Producer
Responsibility
Program –
take back
(both
individual and
collective)

2011

Manufacturer operated - New
York E-waste Program

comp, Laptops, comp Peripherals
(comp Monitors, Keyboards,
Mice, Fax Machines, Printers,
Scanners), Small Electronic
Equipment (Portable Digital
Music Players, VCRs, DVD
Players, DVRs, Digital
Conv.Boxes, Cable/Satellite
Receivers, Video Game
Consoles), Small Scale Servers,
TVs

Yes, manufacturer,
retailers, and
owner/operators –
2011;
individual/household
– 2012; all entities 2015

2011,
2012,
2015

New York Electrnoic
Equipment Recycling and
Reuse Act

New York
Electronic
Equipment
Recycling and Reuse
Act

13

14

15

North
Carolina

Oklahoma

Oregon

PRP – take
back & trade
credits

PRP – take
back

PRP

2010

Manufacturer Operated –
North Caroline Electronics
Management Program

Yes, Computers, Laptops,
Computer Monitors, (Keyboards,
Mice), Printer Devices,
Televisions

Yes, computers,
laptops, comp
monitors,
televisions,
keyboards, mice

2011

2009

Manufacturer operated

Yes, computers, laptops,
computer monitors

None

2009

Manufacturer operated,
Oregon e-cycles

Yes, Computers, Laptops,
Computer Monitors, and
Televisions. (Beginning in 2015,
Keyboards, Mice, and Printers)

Yes, computers,
laptops, comp
monitors and TVs

2010

North Caroline
Department of
Environment and Natural
Resources
Oklahoma Department of
Environmental Quality

Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality

Sources

Enforcing
Department?

Effective Year Ban?

Landfill Ban for
Electronics

For Electronics?

Recycling Program

Year

State

#

Program Type
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Discarded Computer
Equipment and
Television
Management Law
Oklahoma Computer
Equipment Recovery
Act
Oklahoma E-Waste
Recycling Rule
Oregon Electronics
Recycling Law
Oregon Laws 2015
(PDF)
Pennsylvania
Covered Device
Recycling Act
Rhode Island
Electronic Waste
Prevention, Reuse
and Recycling Act

16

Pennsylva
nia

PRP -

2012

Manufacturer operated, PA
electronics recycling
management program

Yes, Computers, Laptops,
Computer Monitors, (Printers,
Keyboards, Mice), Televisions

Yes, certain
electronics

2013

Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental
Protection

17

Rhode
Island

PRP – take
back
legislation and
trade credits

2009

Yes, state operated, rhode
island electronic waste
program

Yes, computers, laptops,
computer monitors, and
televisions

Yes, comp, laptops,
comp monitors, and
TVs

2009

Rhode Island Department
of Environmental
Management

18

South
Carolina

PRP – take
back & trade
credits

2011

Manufacturer operated - ecycle south carolina

Yes, comps, laptops, comp
monitors, printers, TVs

Yes, comp, laptops,
comp monitors,
TVs, printers,
keyboards, mice

2011

South Carolina
Department of Health and
Environmental Control

South Caronlina
Covered Device
Recycling Act

Texas

PRP – take
back
legislation

2008

Manufacturer operated –
Texas computer equipment
recycling program and Texas
television equipment recycling
program

Yes, Computers, Laptops,
Computer Monitors, Computer
Peripherals (Keyboards, Mice),
Televisions

None

Texas computer equipment
recycling law

Texas Computer
Equipment
Recycling Law

19

20

Utah

PRP – plan
only

Manufacturer operated

Yes, Computers, Laptops,
Computer Monitors, Computer
Peripherals (Printers, Keyboards,
Mice), Televisions, Television
Peripherals

None

21

Vermont

PRP

2011

State operated, Vermont ecycles program

Yes, Computers, Laptops,
Computer Monitors, Printers,
Televisions, Computer
Peripherals

Yes, computers,
laptops, computer
monitors, printers,
computer
peripherals,
televisions, personal
electronics (PDA,
personal music
player), electronic
game consoles, fax
machines, cell
phones, telephones,
answering machines,
VCRs, DVD
players, digital
converter boxes,
stereo equipment,
and power supply
cord (as used to
charge electronic
devices)

22

Virginia

PRP

2009

Manufacturer program,
Program Website:Virginia
Computer Recover and
Recycling Program

Yes, computers, laptops, comp
monitors

None

Washingt
on

PRP – state
operated –
producer
pays– trade
credits

23

2009

State operated – e-cycle
Washington

Yes, computers, laptops, comp
monitors, TVs

None

Utah Department of
Environmental Quality

Sources

Enforcing
Department?

Effective Year Ban?

Landfill Ban for
Electronics

For Electronics?

Recycling Program

Year

State

#

Program Type
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Utah Disposal of
Electronic Waste
Law

Vermont Collection
and Recycling of
Electronic Devices
Law

2011

Vermont Department of
Environmental
Conservation

Vermont Procedure
for the
Environmentally
Sound Management
of Electronic
Devices for
Collectors,
Transporters, and
Recyclers

Virginia Department of
Environmental Quality

Virginia Computer
Recovery and
Recycling Act

Washington Department of
Ecology

--Washington
Electronic Product
Recycling Law
--Washington
Electronic Products
Recycling Program
Rules

Yes, computers, laptops, comp
monitors, televisions

25

Wisconsin

PRP

2010

Manufacturer operated - ECycle Wisconsin Program

Yes, Computers, Laptops,
Computer Monitors, Printers,
Televisions

State

Source: ETBC, 2016; ERCC, 2016; PSI, 2016

Key
Advance Recycling Fee
Education Only
State-Operated Program
Manufacturer-Operated Program

Yes, computers,
laptops, comp
monitors, TVs
Yes, televisions,
computers, laptops,
computer monitors,
computer
peripherals, printers,
fax machines, DVD
players, VCRs and
cell phones that
became effective

Sources

Manufacturers operated – west
Virginia electronics recycling
programs

Enforcing
Department?

2009

Effective Year Ban?

PRP

Landfill Ban for
Electronics

West
Virginia

#

For Electronics?

Recycling Program

24

Program Type

Year

100

2011

West Virginia Department
of Environmental
Protection

West Virginia
Covered Electronic
Device Law

2010

Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources

Wisconsin
Electronic Waste
Recycling Act

